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Case No. 20090894-SC
INTHE

UTAH SUPREME COURT
TROVON DONTA ROSS,
Petitioner / Appellant,
vs.

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent/Appellee.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Petitioner, Trovon Donta Ross, appeals the denial of his petition for relief
under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) challenging his conviction for
aggravated murder, a capital felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202.
This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) (West 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
This Court affirmed Ross's conviction in an appeal where new counsel
represented him. Ross then sought post-conviction relief on claims that (1) his
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an extreme emotional distress
defense and (2) his appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising this claim of
trial counsel ineffectiveness. The State moved for summary judgment on both
claims, arguing that the first claim was procedurally barred and that the second
failed as a matter of law.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1. Did the post-conviction court correctly deny as procedurally barred
Ross's claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness because he could have raised it on
appeal?
2. Did the post-conviction court correctly conclude that Ross's claim of
appellate counsel ineffectiveness failed as a matter of law?
Standard of review for issues 1 and 2. This Court will "'review an appeal
from an order dismissing or denying a petition for post-conviction relief for
correctness without deference to the lower court's conclusions of law.'" Gardner
v. State, 2010 UT 46, f 55, 234 P.3d 1115 (quoting Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, f 13,
156 P.3d 739). Likewise, this Court will "'review a district court's decision to
grant summary judgment for correctness.'" Allen v. Moyer, 2011 UT 44, % 5, 687
Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (quoting City of Grantsville v. Redevelopment Agency, 2010 UT 38,
^8,233P.3d461).
3. Did the post-conviction court abuse its discretion in denying Ross's
motion for appointment of pro bono counsel under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9109?
Standard of review. This Court reviews the denial of a motion to appoint
counsel under the PCRA for an abuse of discretion. See Huichings v. State, 2003
UT 52, If 20, 84 P.3d 1150 (recognizing that section 78-35a-109-the prior version
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of section 78B-9-109—leaves the appointment of counsel "to the court's
discretion").
STATUTES AND RULES
The following statutes and rules, reproduced in Addendum A, are relevant
to this appeal:
UTAH CODE ANN.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78B-9-106 (WestSupp. 2011);
§ 78B-9-109 (West 2009);

Utah R. Civ. P. 56;
UtahR.Civ.P.65C.
CASE AND FACT STATEMENT
The crimes
Early on a June morning in 2003, Ross knocked on the front door of the
home of his ex-girlfriend, Annie Christensen. TR.433:40-41.1 Ross carried a High
Point .380 semi-automatic pistol hidden in his waistband. TR.433:44, 61. The
gun had a full ammunition clip and a round in the chamber. TR.433:167-69.
Christensen answered the door and let Ross in. TR.433:41. He waited in the
front room while she went back to her bedroom and returned with James May,
her current boyfriend. TR.433:41, 55-56.
Ross asked Christensen to tell May when she and Ross last had sex.
TR.433:44, 59. He also told Christensen to tell May that she hated her father.

1

"TR" indicates the underlying criminal case record. "PCR" indicates the
post-conviction case record.
3
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TR.433:44, 59. When Christensen did not respond, Ross pulled out his gun and
renewed his requests. TR.433:44, 61. Christensen still refused to answer and
begged Ross to leave. TR.433:45, 60.
Ross turned to May and stated, "I can't let her hurt you like she hurt me."
TR.433:46, 60-61. Ross pointed his gun at Christensen, grabbed her arm, and
pushed her past May towards the bedroom. TR.433:46, 62.
May believed that his best hope to save himself and Christensen was to go
for help. TR.433:47. As he went into the garage and got into his car he heard a
gunshot. TR.433:47. He heard two more shots as he frantically tried to start his
car. TR.433:47, 65. Looking up, May saw Ross in the doorway leading into the
garage. TR. 433:48, 65.
Unable to start his car, May threw his keys, jumped out, and ran.
TR.433:48, 65. Ross emptied his gun at May, firing six shots. TR.433:48, 65,16769. The second shot passed through May's right arm and into his chest, lodging
just under the skin in front of his ribs. TR.433:48; 437:34. Bleeding profusely,
May continued running, hopping fences and knocking on neighbors' doors in
search of help. TR.433:48-49. He finally ended up in the middle of the street
where he flagged down a driver who called the police. TR.433:50. When the
police arrived minutes later, May told them that Christensen had been shot and
directed them to her house. TR.433:50, 89-90, 111.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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After killing Christensen and attempting to kill May, Ross called
Christensen's father, Steven Christensen. TR.433:158. Ross told Steven, "I just
shot and killed your daughter, Annie, and I'm on my way to your home to finish
the job/' TR.433:158.
Neighbors who heard the gunshots saw a white van speeding away from
Christensen's home and called 911 to report the shots and the van's description.
TR.433:73-74, 76, 80, 83-85. Several police officers on route to Christensen's home
passed the van, turned around, and activated their lights and sirens. TR.433:12021,133-34. The van sped up and the officers chased it for several miles at speeds
of up to eighty miles an hour. TR.433:124-27,134-36.
During the chase, Ross threw his gun out the window. TR.433:122. A
passing motorist recovered it and turned it over to police. TR.433:142-43, 146.
Ross also called his boss, Richard Luna, during the chase. TR.437:22). He left the
following message on Luna's voicemail: "I just shot Annie, and I'm sorry man. I
just shot her and I've got cops on my butt right now. (inaudible) I'm going to kill
myself. I'm sorry, Richard. I love you man. Bye." TR.423:1; 437:22, 25; State's
Ex. 58. The police eventually cornered Ross in a residential cul-de-sac and, after
a brief foot-chase, arrested him. TR.433:128-30,137-38.
The medical examiner concluded that Ross first shot Christensen in the
back of the head, causing her to collapse. TR.437:51-52. After she fell to the floor,

5
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Ross shot her twice more at point blank range, once in the neck and once in the
abdomen. TR.437:51-52, 70-71.
Police recovered nine spent bullet casings and five expended bullets.
TR.433:176, 189, 195; 437:6-8, 38, 46. Ballistics testing determined that all of the
spent casings and bullets were fired from Ross's gun. TR.437:66-67.
The criminal case

The State charged Ross with aggravated murder, attempted aggravated
murder, and failure to obey an officer's signal to stop. TR.1-3. Ross conceded
that he had murdered Christensen and attempted to murder May; he argued
only that the jury should not convict him of aggravated murder because the two
acts were separate criminal episodes. TR.434:13-14. Stephen R. McCaughey, and

\

William Albright represented Ross at trial. TR.433:!; 434:1.
After the jury retired to deliberate, McCaughey asked to make a record
regarding trial strategy. TR.434:20 (copies of the relevant transcript pages are
included in Addendum B). With Ross present, McCaughey explained that he did
i

not raise an extreme emotional distress defense "because of evidentiary problems
as are known to Mr. Ross and myself and as a matter of trial strategy.
TR.434:20-21.

McCaughey further explained that if a penalty phase were

necessary, Ross would

testify

and

that testimony would

reasonableness of that strategy/' TR.434:21.

show

"the
<
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i

McCaughey explained that he and Ross had discussed this strategy "a lot,
on numerous occasions/' TR.434:21. Ross confirmed that he had discussed the
strategy with his counsel and that he agreed with it. TR.21-22.
A jury convicted Ross of aggravated murder and all other charges.
TR.341-43;434:22. Ross then agreed to waive his right to a jury in the penalty
phase, in exchange for the State's recommendation that he be sentenced to life
without parole on the aggravated murder conviction. TR.435:2,9. The trial court
agreed and sentenced Ross to concurrent prison terms of life without parole, five
years to life, and zero to five years. TR.369-72; 435:21-22.
The direct appeal

Ms. Elizabeth Hunt represented Ross on direct appeal. TR.399, 419, 459;
State v. Ross, 2007. UT 89, 174 P.3d 628 (a copy of this opinion is included in
addendum C). Ross claimed on appeal that: (1) Utah's death penalty statute was
unconstitutionally vague; (2) his aggravated murder and attempted aggravated
murder convictions should merge; (3) the impaneling of an anonymous jury
prejudiced him; and (4) the prosecutor committed misconduct. Ross, 2007 UT 89,
f 18. This Court rejected Ross's first, third, and fourth claims, but agreed that his
attempted aggravated murder conviction should merge with his aggravated
murder conviction. Id. f ^f 59, 67. This Court therefore affirmed the conviction

7
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for aggravated murder and vacated the conviction for attempted aggravated
murder. Id.
The post-conviction case

Ross, acting pro se, filed a timely petition for relief under the PCRA raising
fifteen claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness. PCR.5-35, 68-71. Ross also filed a
motion for the appointment of pro bono counsel. PCR.1-2. The post-conviction
court reviewed the petition and found it to be deficient because it did not allege a
sufficient factual basis to support the ineffective assistance claims and Ross
included no supporting memorandum. PCR.70. Pursuant to rule 65C(g)(3) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the post-conviction court returned the petition
to Ross and granted him leave to file an amended petition.2 PCR.70.

\

Ross subsequently filed a fifty-two-page memorandum supporting his
petition and asked the post-conviction court to reconsider his petition in light of
the memorandum. PCR. 73-124, 243. The memorandum included further detail
regarding Ross's claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness. PCR.85-122. Ross also
added a claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue on
appeal that trial counsel wras ineffective for foregoing an extreme emotional
distress defense.

PCR.122.

Ross also explained his relationship with

2

Rule 65C was amended in January 2010 and this subsection was
redesignated as 65C(h)(3). Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(h)(3) (2011).
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<

Christensen. PCR.74-80. Among other things, he acknowledged that he knew
that Christensen was dating other men, including May. PCR. 75-77. He also
acknowledged that "both were sexually active with other partners/7 PCR.78.
Ross also filed a second motion for appointment of pro bono counsel. PCR.263.
The post-conviction court reviewed

the petition and

supporting

memorandum for frivolousness pursuant to rule 65C(g) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. PCR.255. The post-conviction court dismissed as frivolous all
of Ross's claims with the exception of his "claims of ineffective assistance of trial
and appellate counsel pertaining to the failure of counsel to raise the affirmative
defense" of extreme emotional distress. PCR.255. The court ordered the State to
respond to these two remaining claims. PCR.257. The post-conviction court
denied Ross's motions for appointment of pro bono counsel as premature.
PCR.265-66 (a copy of this order is included in Addendum F).3
The State responded to the petition by moving for summary judgment on
both of Ross's claims. PCR.287-305. Ross opposed the State's motion. PCR.33541. He also filed a motion for default judgment, arguing that the State's response
was untimely filed.

PCR.344-46. He never renewed his motion to appoint

counsel.

3

The record contains two consecutive pages numbered R.265.
9
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The post-conviction court granted the State's summary judgment motion
and denied Ross's motion for a default judgment. PCR.353-66 (a copy of the
post-conviction court's order is attached as Addendum D). Ross timely appeals.
PCR.369.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

The post-conviction court correctly denied as procedurally barred

Ross's claiixi that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to assert an extreme
emotional distress defense. The PCRA bars a petitioner from obtaining relief on
any claim that he could have raised on direct appeal. Ross could have raised this
claim in his direct appeal because he was represented by new counsel and had
the means to assure an adequate record for appellate review. In fact, Ross admits
that he could have raised this claim on direct appeal.

Therefore, the post-

conviction court correctly denied the claim as procedurally barred.
II. The post-conviction court correctly concluded that Ross's claim that
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise his claim of trial counsel
ineffectiveness failed as a matter of law. Ross did not proffer evidence that, if
proven, would have demonstrated that the claim was obvious from the record
and would have likely succeeded on appeal. Ross failed to show that the claim
was obvious from the record because the record contained trial counsels'
explanation that, although they recognized the evidence could support an

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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i

extreme emotional distress defense, they made a strategic decision not to raise
the defense based on extra-record facts known only to counsel and Ross. This
was not a case where counsel overlooked an obvious defense.
Ross also failed to show that the claim likely would have succeeded on
appeal. Ross first argues that he met this standard because, although counsel
explained that they strategically chose not to raise the defense, they never fully
explained their reasoning.

Because, according to Ross, the record did not

establish that trial counsels' strategic decision actually was reasonable, and
because the evidence would have supported the defense, Ross argues that the
post-conviction court erroneously concluded that an appellate claim of trial
counsel ineffectiveness would not have likely succeeded.

However, this

argument ignores the fact that Ross bore the burden of demonstrating
ineffectiveness.

It also ignores the fact that his trial counsels' decision was

presumptively reasonable.
To show that his appellate counsel could have likely succeeded on this
claim, Ross bore the burden of proffering evidence that would show how
appellate counsel could have overcome the strong presumption that his trial
counsel performed effectively. Therefore, Ross had to allege the reasons that his
trial counsel chose not to raise the defense even though the evidence supported

11
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it, and then explain why those reasons were inadequate. Because he did not, his
claim failed as a matter of law.
Alternatively, Ross argues that he overcame the presumption that his
counsels' decision to forego the defense was reasonable because the evidence in
his case would have supported the defense. But the fact that the record evidence
supported

his defense

was insufficient

to rebut the presumption of

reasonableness where counsel recognized that the record evidence would have
supported the defense, yet still made a strategic decision not to raise it because of
evidentiary problems known only to counsel and Ross. Because Ross never
alleged why his counsels' strategy was unreasonable, the post-conviction court
correctly denied his claim.
III. The post-conviction court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Ross's motions for appointment of pro bono counsel as premature. Ross filed the
motions before the State had responded to his claims. The post-conviction court
had dismissed as frivolous all but two of Ross's claims. The true complexity of
those remaining claims and the need for an evidentiary hearing was not clear
where the State had not yet responded. Moreover, Ross's filings to that point
demonstrated his ability to proceed on his own. Therefore, the post-conviction
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions as premature.

12
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Ross did not renew his motion for counsel after receiving the State's
motion for summary judgment although the post-conviction court had expressly
granted him leave to do so. Instead, he filed a pro se response. Therefore, Ross
tacitly conceded that he did not need counsel's assistance to respond to the
State's motion.
ARGUMENT
I.

ROSS'S CLAIM OF TRIAL COUNSEL INEFFECTIVENESS IS
PROCEDURALLY BARRED
Ross sought post-conviction relief on the ground that his trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to raise an extreme emotional distress defense. PCR.8, 85102. The State responded that it was entitled to summary judgment on this claim
because the claim was procedurally barred where Ross could have raised it on
direct appeal. PCR.301-02. The post-conviction court agreed. PCR.360-62 (Add.
D).
Ross appears to argue that the post-conviction court erroneously found his
claim to be procedurally barred. Br. Aplt. at 12-14. He contends that "the district
court erroneously ruled that Mr. Ross was precluded from raising ineffective
assistance of counsel under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act/' Br. Aplt. at 12
(holding and capitalization omitted). However, Ross never explains exactly how
the post-conviction court erred in denying his claim of trial counsel
ineffectiveness as procedurally barred. Br. Aplt. at 12-14. Rather, he admits that
13
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"[b]ecause [he] was represented by different counsel on direct appeal, the issues
could have been raised on direct appeal." Id. at 13. Ross's admission defeats any
assertion that the post-conviction court erroneously found this claim to be
procedurally barred.
A petitioner cannot obtain post-conviction relief on a claim that he could
have raised on direct appeal because '"[a] petition for post-conviction relief 'is
not a substitute for appellate review/" Kell v. State, 2008 UT 62, f 13,194 P.3d
913 (quoting Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, % 14, 156 P.3d 739). The PCRA bars a
petitioner from proceeding on "any ground that.. . could have been but was not
raised at trial or on appeal." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76B-9-106(l)(c) (West Supp.
2011).*
A defendant can raise in his direct appeal a claim of trial counsel
ineffectiveness when (1) he is represented on appeal by new counsel, and (2) the
appellate record is adequate. See State v. Liiherland, 2000 UT 76, % 12-17,12 P.3d
92.

The post-conviction court correctly found that both requirements were

satisfied in Ross's case. First, Ross's appellate counsel, Ms. Elizabeth Hunt, did
not represent Ross at trial. TR.433:1. Second, rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, allowed Ross to ensure that the appellate record would be adequate

4

Although this section was amended in 2010, the amendments do not
change the substance of the relevant provision; therefore, the State cites to the
current version of the statute.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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i

to adjudicate his claim. See Litherland, 2000 UT 76 at f 14; Utah R. App. P. 23B(a)
(" A party to an appeal in a criminal case may move the court to remand the case
to the trial court for entry of findings of fact, necessary for the appellate court's
determination of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel").
Ross does not explain why he could not have raised on direct appeal his
claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness. Rather, he admits that he could have done
so. Br. Aplt. at 13. Therefore, Ross demonstrates no error in the post-conviction
court's conclusion that his claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness was procedurally
barred. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-106(l)(c).
IL ROSS'S CLAIM OF APPELLATE COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW
Ross also sought post-conviction relief on a claim that his appellate counsel
was ineffective for failing to raise on direct appeal his claim that trial counsel was
ineffective for not asserting an extreme emotional distress defense. PCR.122.
The post-conviction court agreed with the State that this claim failed as a matter
of law. PCR.362-66 (Add. D). Ross demonstrates no error in that ruling.
To demonstrate that his appellate counsel "was ineffective for omitting a
claim/7 Ross had to show that the "'issue [was] obvious from the trial record and
. . . probably would have resulted in reversal on appeal/" Lafferty v. State, 2007
UT 73, | 39 175 P.3d 530 (quoting Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, f 16,156 P.3d 739)
(alteration in original).
15
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The post-conviction court found that Ross's challenge to trial counsel's
decision not to raise an extreme emotional distress defense was not obvious from
the trial record because that record demonstrated that (1) trial counsel had a
strategic reason for not raising the defense and (2) Ross agreed with that strategy.
PCR.363-65. Ross nevertheless argues that "[t]he numerous facts in the record
suggesting [he] reacted to extreme emotional distress make it obvious that trial
counsel could have and should have raised the affirmative defense/' Br. Aplt. at
22.

However, this is not a case where the record shows that trial counsel

overlooked an obvious defense. Rather, trial counsel explained on the record
that they recognized the possibility of raising the defense based on the facts of
the case, but nevertheless made a conscious, strategic decision not to do so based
on extra-record information.

That strategic decision was presumptively

reasonable. See State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 685 (Utah 1997) (recognizing the
""'strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance"'")(quoting State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182,18687 (Utah 1990)) (in turn quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)).
Given this record, the post-conviction court correctly concluded that the claim of
trial counsel ineffectiveness was not obvious.
The post-conviction court also concluded that the claim would not have
likely resulted in reversal on appeal because Ross alleged no facts that appellate
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counsel could have relied on to rebut the strong presumption that trial counsels'
strategy was reasonable. PCR.365. Ross contends that a genuine issue of fact
exists about the reasonableness of trial counsels' strategy because trial counsel
failed to raise the defense even though there was evidence that tended to show
that he acted under extreme emotional distress. Br. Aplt. at 16-22. Ross contends
that trial counsel never fully explained their reasons for not raising the defense
and no facts in the record demonstrate that trial counsel's strategy was, in fact,
reasonable. Br. Aplt. at 25. Ross demonstrates no error in the post-conviction
court's ruling because his argument ignores (1) that he had the burden of
demonstrating ineffectiveness, and (2) that his counsels' strategic decision was
presumptively reasonable.
Ross erroneously presumes that the State had the burden of demonstrating
that trial counsels' strategic decision was in fact reasonable, and therefore an
ineffectiveness claim would have likely been unsuccessful on appeal. Br. Aplt. at
25. He argues that the post-conviction court's grant of summary judgment was
erroneous because "[t]he record contains no reasons for [trial counsel's]
purported strategy, nor any analysis to support it." Id. He further asserts that
"the post-conviction court cannot determine as a matter of law that a reasonable
strategy existed when counsel did no more than state that he had a strategy." Id.
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Ross's claim fails because he confuses which party bore the burden of
proof below. The State did not have the burden of demonstrating that trial
counsels' strategy was reasonable, and therefore an appellate claim of
ineffectiveness would not have succeeded. Rather, as the petitioner, Ross bore
the burden of demonstrating that his appellate counsel could have likely
succeeded on this claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness. See Fernandez v. Cook, 870
P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993) (recognizing that the petitioner "bears the burden of
proving his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel"). To show that this claim
would have likely succeeded on appeal, Ross had the burden of demonstrating
that his appellate counsel could have likely shown that:

(1) trial counsels'

strategic decision not to raise the extreme emotional distress defense was
objectively unreasonable and (2) there was a reasonable probability that the
defense would have succeeded had trial counsel raised it.

See Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 690, (1984); Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521
(Utah 1994). In so doing, Ross had the burden of showing how appellate counsel
could have overcome the "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Taylor, 947 P.2d at
685 (additional citations omitted).
Because trial counsels' strategic decision was presumptively reasonable,
Ross could not satisfy his burden simply by alleging that the trial record did not
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fully explain the reasoning behind his counsels7 strategic decision. Rather, in
responding to the State's summary judgment motion, Ross had to proffer facts
that, if proven, would have rebutted the strong presumption that his trial
counsel's decision was reasonable.

However, he failed to do so. PCR.365.

Therefore, the post-conviction court correctly granted the State summary
judgment and denied this claim.
Alternatively, Ross argues that he alleged sufficient facts to create a
genuine issue of fact regarding the reasonableness of his counsels' strategic
decision because he alleged that the evidence in his case would have supported
an extreme emotional distress defense. Br. Aplt. at 19-23. He asserts that "[t]he
presence of such facts are sufficient to rebut any presumption [that] trial
counsel's strategy" was reasonable. Id. at 23.
But the mere fact that there was some evidence to support an extreme
emotional distress defense does not rebut the presumption that trial counsel
acted reasonably in choosing not to raise that defense. Presumably anticipating
this very claim of ineffectiveness, trial counsel made sure to explain on the record
that they recognized that extreme emotional distress was a possible defense.
TR.434:20-21. They further explained that they made a conscious and strategic
decision not to raise that defense "because of evidentiary problems" that were
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known only to Ross and counsel.5 TR.434:20-21. Ross agreed with that strategy.
TR.434:21-22. This strategic decision was presumptively reasonable. See Taylor,
947P.2dat685.
Ross could not overcome this presumption of reasonableness by merely
arguing that the evidence could have supported the defense.

Trial counsel

explained that they recognized that the evidence supported the defense. They
nevertheless made a strategic decision not to raise it based on "evidentiary
problems'7 known to trial counsel and Ross that supported counsel's decision,
and that have never been revealed. TR.434:21. In opposing the State's summary
judgment motion, Ross had the burden to proffer evidence of what those
evidentiary problems were in order to rebut the presumption that, based on that
undisclosed information, counsel made a reasonable decision. Ross's allegations
in his memorandum supporting his petition may provide some insight into what
those evidentiary problems were. If Ross disclosed to his counsel that he and
Christensen "were sexually active with other partners," PCR.78, that disclosure
would have undercut an extreme emotional distress defense based on Ross
finding Christensen with another man.

5

As explained in the case and fact statement, counsel did not go on to
explain their reasoning on the record because they anticipated that reasoning to
become clear when Ross testified at the penalty hearing.
TR.434:21.
Unfortunately, however, the penalty hearing became unnecessary when later
negotiations lead to an agreed upon sentence of life without parole. TR.435:2, 9.
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The post-conviction court correctly found that because "trial counsel's
decision not to raise the affirmative defense was strategic, [Ross] must set forth
facts and argument to rebut the strong presumption of effectiveness regarding
this decision/7 PCR.365 (Add. D). Ross had to do more than show that counsel
could have raised the defense. He had to allege facts that, if proven, would
demonstrate why it was unreasonable not to raise the defense even though the
evidence supported it.
Ross alleged no such facts below even though [he] discussed the issue with
his defense counsel "a lot, on numerous occasions/' TR.434:21. He did not
explain what he understood to be the reasoning behind his defense counsels'
decision. He provided no analysis why that decision was unreasonable. Nor did
he explain why he agreed with that decision at trial, even though he now
considers it unreasonable. Rather, he simply argued below —as he does in his
appellate brief—that his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to raise the
defense because there was evidence to support it. PCR.85-90; Br. Aplt. at 19-27.
However, as explained, that allegation was insufficient on this record to rebut the
presumption that trial counsels' strategic decision was reasonable.
Ross does point to one reference in his opposition to the State's summary
judgment motion that, according to him, raised a genuine issue of fact as to the
reasonableness of his counsels' strategy. Br. Aplt. at 28. He claims in his brief
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that he alleged below that his trial counsel told him that they did not raise the
extreme emotional distress defense because "he was of 'sound mind.'" Id. He
argues that this allegation was sufficient to raise an issue of material fact "as to
whether counsel misunderstood the law" and therefore made an unreasonable
strategic decision "[b]ecause of soundness of mind is irrelevant to an extreme
emotional distress affirmative defense." Br. Aplt. at 28-29.
However, this reference did not create an issue of material fact because it
did not refer to Ross's explanation of the reasons that counsel did not raise a
defense of extreme emotional distress. Rather, the statement that Ross was of
"sound mind" refers to Ross's understanding of why counsel did not raise a
defense claiming that he acted under a delusion attributable to mental illness.
PCR.336-337 (a copy of Ross's opposition to the State's summary judgment
motion is included as Addendum E).
Ross discussed a defense based on a delusion attributable to mental illness
because he believed that the State had misinterpreted his petition to claim that
his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise that defense, rather than his
original claim regarding the omission of an extreme emotional distress defense.
PCR.336-37. In his opposition to the State's summary judgment motion, Ross
first referred to the portion of the criminal record on which the State relied —trial
counsel's explanation that, because of "evidentiary problems" known only to
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Ross and counsel, "[t]here was no manslaughter defense raised based on any
extreme emotional disturbance/'

PCR.336.

Ross then argued that "[t]he

'manslaughter defense' Respondents appear to be relying on is Utah Code 76-5205[(]l[)](c), which refers to 76-5-205.5 and is defined there as 'a delusion
attributable to a mental illness....'" PCR.336-37.
Ross then explained that he was not claiming that his trial counsel were
ineffective for failing to raise a defense based on a delusion attributable to a
mental illness, but rather an extreme emotional distress defense.

PCR.336.

Apparently seeing a distinction between an emotional disturbance and an
emotional distress defense, Ross explained:
However, Respondents are completely off point here: manslaughter
and its 'emotional disturbance defense' is not what was claimed, nor
held by the order below, or Petitioner.6
What was held to be the issue was 76-5-202-3-a-i, 'under the
influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a
reasonable explanation or excuse.'
PCR.336 (emphasis added).

Thus, in his opposition to the State's summary

judgment motion, Ross was using the phrase "extreme emotional disturbance" to

6

In referring to "the order below," Ross presumably means the postconviction court's order requiring the State to respond to his claims (PCR.255-57).
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refer to a defense that he acted under a delusion attributable to a mental illness,
not an extreme emotional distress defense.7
Ross then explained that his counsel "did not raise a 'manslaughter
defense based on any extreme emotional disturbance' because counsel had
inferred that the mental evaluations were holding him of sound mind, and that
the evidence of the case precluded raising that defense." PCR.336. Ross further
explained that his defense counsel told him "the mental evaluations would not
support" a delusion defense. PCR.337.
In their proper context, Ross's explanation that his trial counsel did not
raise a manslaughter defense because he was "of sound mind" did not refer to
counsels' reasons for not raising an extreme emotional distress defense. Rather,
Ross was explaining why counsel did not raise a defense of delusion attributable

7

The phrases "extreme emotional disturbance" and "extreme emotional
distress" do not refer to different defenses. When trial counsel referred to the
defense as "extreme emotional disturbance" he was simply using an old
statutory label for the extreme emotional distress defense. At the time of Ross's
trial, the statute described the defense as one of "extreme emotional distress/' See
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(3)(a)(i) (West 2004) ("It is an affirmative defense to a
charge of aggravated murder . . . that the defendant caused the death of another .
. . under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a
reasonable explanation or excuse.") (emphasis added). However, statutes had
earlier referred to the defense as one of "extreme emotional disturbance/' See
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(b) (1997) ("Criminal homicide constitutes
manslaughter if the actor: . . . (b) causes the death of another under the influence
of extreme emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation or
excuse.") (emphasis added). Therefore, trial counsel was simply referring to the
extreme emotional distress defense by its old statutory label.
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to a mental illness. Therefore, contrary to Ross's contention in his brief, his
explanation of his counsels' reasoning did not create a genuine issue of material
fact regarding the reasonableness of counsels' decision not to raise an extreme
emotional distress defense.
Ross alleged no facts explaining why his counsel unreasonably chose not
to raise the extreme emotional distress defense. Therefore, the post-conviction
court correctly found that Ross had failed to allege any basis on which appellate
counsel could have overcome the presumption that trial counsel performed
effectively in deciding not to raise an extreme emotional distress defense.
PCR.365 (Add. D). Consequently, the post-conviction court correctly concluded
that Ross's claim of appellate counsel ineffectiveness failed as a matter of law.
III. THE POST-CONVICTION COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN DENYING ROSS'S MOTION FOR
APPOINTMENT OF PRO BONO COUNSEL
Ross filed two motions for the appointment of pro bono counsel under
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78B-9-1Q9. PCR.1-2, 263. He filed the first motion with his

petition and his second motion when he filed his supporting memorandum.
PCR.1-2, 263. The post-conviction court denied Ross's motions as premature.
PCR. 265=66 (Add. F). The post-conviction court reasoned that it was not clear
whether Ross needed counsel when he filed his motions because the complexity
of Ross's remaining claims and the need for an evidentiary hearing was
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uncertain. Id. The court had dismissed the majority of Ross's claims as frivolous
and the State had yet to respond to the remaining claims. Id.
Ross argues that "the post-conviction court abused its discretion in
denying [his] requests for counsel because the petition involved complicated
issues of law and fact." Br. Aplt. at 34 (bolding and capitalization omitted). On
the contrary, the post-conviction court appropriately exercised its discretion
because it was not clear that the case had become so complicated that it exceeded
Ross's ability to proceed on his own. Moreover, Ross never renewed his motion
after he received the State's summary judgment motion.
This Court "will find that a trial court has abused its discretion 'only if the
trial court's decision was beyond the limits of reasonability.'" State v. Arguelles,
2003 UT 1, Tf 101, 63 P.3d 731 (quoting State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah
1993)). Thus, "an abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court's actions are
'inherently unfair' or 'if [this Court] conclude[s] that no reasonable [person]
would take the view adopted by the trial court.'" Id. (quoting State v. Russell, 791
P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 1990) & State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah
Ct.App.1997)) (last alteration in original).
"[T]here is no statutory or constitutional right to counsel in a civil petition
for post-convcition relief." Hutchings v. State, 2003 UT 52, f 20, 84 P.3d 1150
(citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-109 (1999) and Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S.
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551, 555-56 (1987)).

Nevertheless, the PCRA grants a post-conviction court

discretion to appoint pro bono counsel to an indigent petitioner if the court
concludes that the circumstances of the case merit such an appointment. UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78B-9-109 (West 2009). The PCRA provides that "[i]f any portion of
the petition is not summarily dismissed, the court may, upon the request of an
indigent petitioner, appoint counsel on a pro bono basis to represent the
petitioner in the post-conviction court or on post-conviction appeal/' Id. § 78B-9109(1). The PCRA also gives the court some guidance in determining when it is
appropriate to appoint counsel.

See id. at 78B-9-109(2). It states that "[i]n

determining whether to appoint counsel, the court shall consider the following
factors: (a) whether the petition or the appeal contains factual allegations that
will require an evidentiary hearing; and (b) whether the petition involves
complicated issues of law or fact that require the assistance of counsel for proper
adjudication/'8 Id.

8

Ross argues that this Court has interpreted this provision as requiring a
post-conviction court to appoint counsel whenever either of the two
considerations in subsection 78B-9-109(2) exist. Br. Aplt. at 34. For support, he
quotes a sentence from Ford v. State, 2008 UT 66, f 15,199 P.3d 892, in which this
Court explains the content of the PCRA's provision for appointing pro bono
counsel. Br. Aplt. at 34 (quoting Ford, 2008 UT 66, | 15). However, Ross reads
too much into this sentence from Ford. The sentence does not interpret the PCRA
and, in any event, is dicta.
This Court did not interpret section 78B-9-109 in Ford. The issue there was
"whether defendants who succeed in vacating their convictions in a postconviction relief proceeding are entitled to paid counsel to represent them during
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The post-conviction court appropriately exercised its discretion in denying
Ross's motions for appointment of pro bono counsel as premature. The true
complexity of Ross's remaining claims and the need for an evidentiary hearing
was uncertain where the State had not yet responded to the claims. Without the
State's response it was unclear what defenses Ross would have to respond to and
whether the claims could be summarily dismissed, or whether a hearing would
be required. Therefore, the applicability of the section 78B-9-109(2) factors was
unclear.
the State's appeal." Ford, 2008 UT 66,11 (emphasis added). This Court held that
such defendants are "entitled to the assistance of paid counsel on appeal
pursuant to he Indigent Defense Act, the Utah Constitution, and the United
States Constitution." Id. at f 14. In reaching this holding, the Court recognized
that the PCRA's provision allowing for the appointment of pro bono counsel
"does not conflict with the Indigent Defense Act." .Id. at f 15. The Court then
explained the substance of the PCRA's provision, stating, "[t]he Act indicates
such appointment should occur at the request of the petitioner, and where an
evidentiary hearing would be required or the 'petition involves complicated
issues of law or fact that required the assistance of counsel for proper
adjudication.'" Id. (quoting § 78B-9-109(2)).
Ross relies on this Court's use of the word "should," to support his
argument that this Court interpreted the PCRA to require the appointment of
counsel whenever either requirement of the subsection was met. Br. Aplt. at 34.
In context, however, the Court was simply repeating the statutory language, not
interpreting it. See Ford, 2008 UT 66 at \ 15.
Even if this Court did interpret section 78b-9-109 in Ford, that
interpretation is dicta because the issue in Ford did not involve appointment of
pro bono counsel under the PCRA. See Beaver County v. Home Indem. Co., 52 P.2d
4357 444-45 (Utah 1935) ("Obiter dicta is that part of an opinion which does not
express any final conclusion on any legal question presented by the case for
determination or any conclusion on any prin[c]iple of law which it is necessary
to determine as basis for a final conclusion on one or more questions to be
decided by the court")
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Nor was it apparent on the face of Ross's pleadings that his claims were so
complex that he could not proceed on his own. As explained above, Ross simply
had to allege why his trial counsel chose not to raise an extreme emotional
distress defense, and then explain why that choice was unreasonable under the
circumstances of his case. The facts supporting these allegations and analysis
were within Ross's grasp and ability.

He was privy to the discussions

surrounding his counsels' decision. Ross and his counsel had "talked about [that
decision] a lot, on numerous occasions." TR.434:21. Moreover, trial counsel
believed that Ross's own testimony would demonstrate the reasonableness of
this decision. TR.434:21. Therefore, the reasonableness of counsels' decision
appears to have been based entirely on facts that Ross knew.
Ross's filings demonstrated that he had the ability to litigate his case on his
own. Appellate counsel herself relies on what she characterizes as Ross's own
"apt" articulation of his arguments below. Br. Aplt. at 29 (quoting PCR.115-16).
Ross claims in his brief that "[discovering errors in an attorney's representation
is difficult, if not impossible for a non-lawyer." Br. Aplt. at 36. However, he was
able to file a pro se petition alleging fifteen claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. PCR.68-71. Ross was also able to recognize the need to frame his
surviving claim as one of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel to avoid the
PCRA's procedural bar. PCR.122. Ross's memorandum supporting his post-
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conviction petition spans fifty-two pages and includes attachments containing
over one hundred pages of discovery from the criminal case. PCR.73-124, 125241. In that memorandum, Ross provides a detailed statement of the facts of his
case and a detailed discussion of the extreme emotional distress defense.
i

PRC.73-91. Ross understood the facts of his case and how the defense could have
applied. In short, the record confirms the post-conviction court's conclusion that
i

Ross did not yet require pro bono counsel.
Moreover, the post-conviction court did not foreclose Ross from renewing
his motion after the State had responded to his claims. Rather, it expressly
granted Ross "leave to renew his motion to appoint counsel at the proper time in
the proceedings/'

PCR.266. However, Ross never renewed his motion for

i

counsel after receiving the State's motion for summary judgment. Rather, he
filed his opposition pro se. Therefore, he implicitly conceded that he did not
require the assistance of counsel to respond to the State's motion.
In sum, the applicability of the factors in section 78B-9-109(2) was unclear
when Ross filed his motions for counsel and his filings to that point demonstrate
that he could proceed on his own.

Therefore, the post-conviction court's

conclusion that the motions were premature was not objectively unreasonable.

i

Accordingly, the post-conviction court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Ross's motions. See Arguelles, 2003 UT1,1101.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the denial of the
petition for post-conviction relief.
Respectfully submitted _«Z2_ August 2011.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-106 (West Supp. 2011) Preclusion of relief Exception
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that:
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion;
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal;
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal;
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief
or could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for postconviction relief; or
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78B-9-107.
(2) (a) The state may raise any of the procedural bars or time bar at any time,
including during the state's appeal from an order granting post-conviction relief,
unless the court determines that the state should have raised the time bar or
procedural bar at an earlier time.
(b) Any court may raise a procedural bar or time bar on its own motion,
provided that it gives the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard.
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a
basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if
the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel.
(4) This section authorizes a merits review only to the extent required to address
the exception set forth in Subsection (3).
Credits
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1170, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 288, § 5, eff. May 5, 2008;
Laws 2010, c. 48, § 1, eff. May 11, 2010.
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-109 (West 2009) Appointment of pro bono counsel
(1) If any portion of the petition is not summarily dismissed, the court may, upon
the request of an indigent petitioner, appoint counsel on a pro bono basis to
represent the petitioner in the post-conviction court or on post-conviction appeal.
Counsel who represented the petitioner at trial or on the direct appeal may not
be appointed to represent the petitioner under this section.
(2) In determining whether to appoint counsel, the court shall consider the
following factors:
(a) whether the petition or the appeal contains factual allegations that will
require an evidentiary hearing; and
(b) whether the petition involves complicated issues of law or fact that require
the assistance of counsel for proper adjudication.
(3) An allegation that counsel appointed under this section was ineffective
cannot be the basis for relief in any subsequent post-conviction petition.
Credits
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1173, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 288, § 8, eff. May 5, 2008.
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Utah R. Civ. P. 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or crossclaim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of
20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for
summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all
or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or crossclaim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for
summary judgment as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits
shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of
damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment
is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and
the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain
what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts
are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order
specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the
extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and
directing such further proceedings in the action as are just Upon the trial of the
action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be
conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified
copies of ail papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented
or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits.
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in
this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of
the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
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rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file
such a response.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a
party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to
this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court
shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused,
including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be
adjudged guilty of contempt.
Credits
[Amended effective November 1,1997; November 1, 2004.]
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Utah R. Civ. P. 65C POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
(a) Scope. This rule governs proceedings in all petitions for post-conviction relief
filed under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Title 78B, Chapter 9.
The Act sets forth the manner and extent to which a person may challenge the
legality of a criminal conviction and sentence after the conviction and sentence
have been affirmed in a direct appeal under Article I, Section 12 of the Utah
Constitution, or the time to file such an appeal has expired.
(b) Procedural defenses and merits review. Except as provided in paragraph
(h), if the court comments on the merits of a post-conviction claim, it shall first
clearly and expressly determine whether that claim is independently precluded
under Section 78B-9-106.
(c) Commencement and venue. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a
petition with the clerk of the district court in the county in which the judgment of
conviction was entered. The petition should be filed on forms provided by the
court. The court may order a change of venue on its own motion if the petition is
filed in the wrong county. The court may order a change of venue on motion of a
party for the convenience of the parties or witnesses.
(d) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims that the
petitioner has in relation to the legality of the conviction or sentence. The petition
shall state:
(d)(1) whether the petitioner is incarcerated and, if so, the place of incarceration;
(d)(2) the name of the court in which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced
and the dates of proceedings in which the conviction was entered, together with
the court's case number for those proceedings, if known by the petitioner;
(d)(3) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of the
petitioner's claim to relief;
(d)(4) whether the judgment of conviction, the sentence, or the commitment for
violation of probation has been reviewed on appeal, and, if so, the number and
title of the appellate proceeding, the issues raised on appeal, and the results of
the appeal;
(d)(5) whether the legality of the conviction or sentence has been adjudicated in
any prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and, if so, the case number
and title of those proceedings, the issues raised in the petition, and the results of
the prior proceeding; and
(d)(6) if the petitioner claims entitlement to relief due to newly discovered
evidence, the reasons why the evidence could not have been discovered in time
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

for the claim to be addressed in the trial, the appeal, or any previous postconviction petition.
(e) Attachments to the petition. If available to the petitioner, the petitioner shall
attach to the petition:
(e)(1) affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the
allegations;
(e)(2) a copy of or a citation to any opinion issued by an appellate court
regarding the direct appeal of the petitioner's case;
(e)(3) a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior post-conviction
or other civil proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the conviction or
sentence; and
(e)(4) a copy of all relevant orders and memoranda of the court.
(f) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or
citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in a
separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed with the petition.
(g) Assignment. On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly assign and
deliver it to the judge who sentenced the petitioner. If the judge who sentenced
the petitioner is not available, the clerk shall assign the case in the normal course.
(h)(1) Summary dismissal of claims. The assigned judge shall review the
petition, and, if it is apparent to the court that any claim has been adjudicated in
a prior proceeding, or if any claim in the petition appears frivolous on its face,
the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating either that
the claim has been adjudicated or that the claim is frivolous on its face. The order
shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate
with the entry of the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite
findings of fact or conclusions of law.
(h)(2) A claim is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the allegations
contained in the pleadings and attachments, it appears that:
(h)(2)(A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law;
(h)(2)(B) the claim has no arguable basis in fact; or
(h)(2)(C) the claim challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expired
prior to the filing of the petition.
(h)(3) If a claim is not frivolous on its face but is deficient due to a pleading error
or failure to comply with the requirements of this rule, the court shall return a
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copy of the petition with leave to amend within 20 days. The court may grant
one additional 20 day period to amend for good cause shown.
(h)(4) The court shall not review for summary dismissal the initial postconviction petition in a case where the petitioner is sentenced to death.
(i) Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that all
or part of the petition should not be summarily dismissed, the court shall
designate the portions of the petition that are not dismissed and direct the clerk
to serve a copy of the petition, attachments and memorandum by mail upon the
respondent. If the petition is a challenge to a felony conviction or sentence, the
respondent is the state of Utah represented by the Attorney General. In all other
cases, the respondent is the governmental entity that prosecuted the petitioner.
(j) Answer or other response. Within 30 days (plus time allowed under these
rules for service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition upon the
respondent, or within such other period of time as the court may allow, the
respondent shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition that
have not been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response upon the
petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within 30 days (plus time allowed for
service by mail) after service of any motion to dismiss or for summary judgment,
the petitioner may respond by memorandum to the motion. No further
pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless ordered by the court.
(k) Hearings. Adter pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set the
proceeding for a hearing or otherwise dispose of the case. The court may also
order a prehearing conference, but the conference shall not be set so as to delay
unreasonably the hearing on the merits of the petition. At the prehearing
conference, the court may:
(k)(l) consider the formation and simplification of issues;
(k)(2) require the parties to identify witnesses and documents; and
(k)(3) require the parties to establish the admissibility of evidence expected to be
presented at the evidentiary hearing.
(1) Presence of the petitioner at hearings. The petitioner shall be present at the
prehearing conference if the petitioner is not represented by counsel. The
prehearing conference may be conducted by means of telephone or video
conferencing. The petitioner shall be present before the court at hearings on
dispositive issues but need not otherwise be present in court during the
proceeding. The court may conduct any hearing at the correctional facility where
the petitioner is confined.
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(m) Discovery; records. Discovery under Rules 26 through 37 shall be allowed
by the court upon motion of a party and a determination that there is good cause
to believe that discovery is necessary to provide a party with evidence that is
likely to be admissible at an evidentiary hearing. The court may order either the
petitioner or the respondent to obtain any relevant transcript or court records.
(n) Orders; stay.
(n)(l) If the court vacates the original conviction or sentence, it shall enter
findings of fact and conclusions of law and an appropriate order. If the petitioner
is serving a sentence for a felony conviction, the order shall be stayed for 5 days.
Within the stay period, the respondent shall give written notice to the court and
the petitioner that the respondent will pursue a new trial, pursue a new sentence,
appeal the order, or take no action. Thereafter the stay of the order is governed
by these rules and by the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
(n)(2) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice that no action will
be taken, the stay shall expire and the court shall deliver forthwith to the
custodian of the petitioner the order to release the petitioner.
(n)(3) If the respondent gives notice that the petitioner will be retried or
resentenced, the trial court may enter any supplementary orders as to
arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that may
be necessary and proper.
(o) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under
Rule 54(d), to any party as it deems appropriate. If the petitioner is indigent, the
court may direct the costs to be paid by the governmental entity that prosecuted
the petitioner. If the petitioner is in the custody of the Department of Corrections,
Utah Code Title 78A, Chapter 2, Part 3 governs the manner and procedure by
which the trial court shall determine the amount, if any, to charge for fees and
costs.
(p) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be
appealed to and reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Utah
in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those courts.
Credits
[Adopted effective July 1,1996; amended effective November 1, 2008; January 4,
2010.]
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FOLLOW THE BAILIFF AT THIS TIME.
(THE JURY EXITS THE COURTROOM.)
THE COURT:
TIME.

YOU TWO ALTERNATES ARE EXCUSED AT THIS

YOU'RE WELCOME TO GO BACK THROUGH THERE AND JUST LEAVE

YOUR TABLETS AND YOUR I.D.S THERE ON THE BAILIFF'S DESK.
WE'LL KEEP THOSE FOR YOU.
THEY'RE YOUR ITEMS.

THEY WILL NOT BE LOOKED AT;

BUT THEN IF YOU'D REPORT BACK WHEN WE

CALL YOU.
WAIT JUST A MINUTE.
NUMBERS FROM YOU.

THE CLERK WILL GET SOME PHONE

OKAY?

(ALTERNATE JURORS LEAVE THE COURTROOM.) .
THE COURT:

THE JURY IS OUT.

MR. MCGUIRE, ANYTHING

FURTHER TO COME BEFORE THE COURT?
MR. McGUIRE:
THE COURT:

NO, YOUR HONOR.

MR. MCCAUGHEY?

MR. McGUIRE:

YOUR HONOR, THERE IS —

WE NEED TO

MAKE A RECORD, AND I THINK WE NEED TO DO IT IN THE COURT'S
CHAMBERS.

IT WOULD BE OKAY, I'M SURE, AFTER THE TRIAL'S

OVER, JUST IF WE CAN MAKE A RECORD.
THE COURT:

OKAY.

WE'LL BE IN RECESS THEN.

WELCOME TO COME IN CHAMBERS.

YOU'RE

WE'LL RECONVENE WHEN THE JURY

RETURNS.
COURT IS IN RECESS.
(RECESS TAKEN)
THE COURT:

WE ARE IN CHAMBERS IN THE MATTER OF
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STATE VERSUS ROSS.

STATE I S PRESENT REPRESENTED BY

MR. MCGUIRE, MR. MAJOR.

THE DEFENDANT, MR. ROSS,

I S PRESENT

REPRESENTED BY H I S ATTORNEYS, MR. MCCAUGHEY AND MR. ALBRIGHT.
THERE I S A MATTER YOU WANTED TO PUT ON THE RECORD,
MR. MCCAUGHEY?
MR. McCAUGHEY:

THERE I S , YOUR HONOR, AND — AND

I T ' S A MATTER I THINK SHOULD BE PUT ON THE RECORD.
* ir-r\

n n n n
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MATTER OF STRATEGY THAT WAS IN THIS CASE — AND I THINK I T ' S
IMPORTANT MAYBE FOR LATER ON DOWN THE ROAD.
BASICALLY, MR.— MR. — WHEN I REPRESENTED — STARTED
REPRESENTING MR. ROSS WE SPOKE — I SPOKE WITH THE COUNTY
ATTORNEY AND THERE WAS AN OFFER MADE.
PLEAD GUILTY,

I F MR. ROSS WOULD

HE WOULD RECEIVE L I F E WITHOUT PAROLE.

AND I DISCUSSED THAT.

MR. ROSS

I T WAS H I S DECISION THAT HE DID NOT

WANT L I F E WITHOUT PAROLE, THAT — THAT HE, IN FACT,

DESIRED

THE DEATH PENALTY.
AND I INSTRUCTED HIM AT THAT POINT THAT EVEN I F HE PLED
GUILTY — AND THERE WAS A QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT THERE
COULD BE AN ADMISSION — EVIDENCE PROBLEMS IN TAKING THAT
GUILTY PLEA OF MR. ROSS - - GIVING THAT GUILTY PLEA.
BUT IN THE EVENT THE GUILTY PLEA WAS ACCEPTED,

I

EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT THERE WOULD STILL BE THE NECESSITY OF A
HEARING, A SENTENCING HEARING,

THAT THE JUDGE CAN NOT IMPOSE

THE DEATH PENALTY WITHOUT THAT HEARING.
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AND I ADVISED HIM, MR. ROSS, THAT IF THAT WAS HIS
POSITION THEN IT WAS TO HIS BENEFIT TO HAVE A TRIAL BECAUSE,
BASICALLY, THE SAME EVIDENCE WOULD BE INTRODUCED AT THE
SENTENCING HEARING AS A TRIAL.

AND IF HE HAD THE TRIAL, THAT

WOULD KEEP HIS OPTIONS OPEN, NOT ONLY FOR POSSIBLE APPEAL
DOWN THE ROAD, BUT ALSO FOR HIS TESTIMONY AT THE PENALTY
PHASE OF THE HEARING. I THINK THE COURT CAN QUESTION MR. ROSS, BUT MR. ROSS
WAS IN AGREEMENT WITH THAT STRATEGY.
THROUGH WITH THAT STRATEGY.

I THINK WE FOLLOWED

THERE WAS NO MANSLAUGHTER

DEFENSE RAISED BASED ON ANY EXTREME EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE
BECAUSE OF -- BECAUSE OF EVIDENTIARY PROBLEMS AS ARE KNOWN TO
MR. ROSS AND MYSELF.
BUT ANYWAY, THAT STRATEGY HAS BEEN FOLLOWED AND I THINK
IF THERE IS A PENALTY PHASE, MR. ROSS WILL TESTIFY.

AND I

THINK ONCE THAT HAPPENS, WHAT HE TESTIFIES TO IS REVEALED, I
THINK WE'LL —
STRATEGY.

WE'LL SHOW THE —

THE REASONABLENESS OF THAT

AND SO I JUST WANTED TO PUT THAT ON THE RECORD IN

CASE DOWN THE ROAD, WHO KNOWS WHAT WILL HAPPEN.
BUT ANYWAY, THAT'S THE REASON I'VE DONE WHAT I'VE DONE.
I THINK MR. ROSS —

HE AND I HAVE TALKED ABOUT THIS A LOT, ON

NUMEROUS OCCASIONS, AND I THINK HE AGREES WITH THAT STRATEGY.
SO I'D LIKE TO PUT THAT ON THE RECORD.
THE COURT:

MR. ROSS, IS THAT, IN FACT, THE

CONVERSATION AND THE STRATEGY THAT YOU AND MR. MCCAUGHEY HAVE
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1

DECIDED ON IN THIS CASE?

2

THE DEFENDANT:

3

THE COURT:

4
5
6
7

ALL RIGHT.

10
11
12

MR. McCAUGHEY:

1UUKI KiVIUKlNS . ;

THE COURT:
COUNSEL ARE PRESENT.

15

A JUROR:

16

THE COURT:

17

A JUROR:

18

THE COURT:

23
24
25

THE PARTIES AND

THE JURY HAS RETURNED.

JURY AS FOREPERSON?

THE COURT:

22

WE'RE BACK IN SESSION.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, HAVE YOU ELECTED A MEMBER OF YOUR

14

21

THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

(PROCEEDING CONCLUDE IN CHAMBERS.)

A JUROR:

20

THANK YOU.

RETURNS.

13

19

OKAY.

WE'LL BE IN RECESS THEN UNTIL THE JURY

d

9

YES, YOUR HONOR.

YES, YOUR HONOR.
THAT'S YOU, MR. GOUGH?

YES, SIR.
HAS THE JURY REACHED A VERDICT?

YES, SIR.
PLEASE DELIVER IT TO THE BAILIFF.

THANK YOU, AND YOU MAY BE SEATED.
(VERDICT TENDERED TO THE COURT).
THE COURT:

MR. ROSS, IF YOU'D PLEASE STAND?

WE'LL ASK THE CLERK TO READ THE VERDICT.
(THE CLERK READS THE VERDICT.)
THE COURT:

YOU MAY BE SEATED.

MR. MCCAUGHEY, DO YOU WISH THE JURY POLLED?
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174 P-3d 628
Supreme Court of Utah.

error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable outcome.
5 Cases that cite this headnote

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Trovon Donta ROSS, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20041073.

Nov. 2, 2 0 0 7 .

Synopsis
Background: Defendant was convicted by a jury in the
Second District Court, Farmington, Rodney S. Page. J.,
of aggravated murder and attempted aggravated murder.
Defendant appealed.
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Nehring. J., held that:
1 aggravated murder statute was not unconstitutionally vague
as applied to defendant;
2 as a matter of first impression, trial court's act of impaneling
an anonymous jury did not constitute plain error;
3. the State's remarks during closing arguments did not
constitute prosecutorial misconduct; and
4 in a separate opinion, Durham, CJ., held that defendant's
convictions for aggravated murder and attempted aggravated
murder merged.
Affirmed in part and vacated in part.
Nehring, J., dissented in part and was joined by Wilkins, CJ.
WestHeadnotes(17)
1

Homicide
#** Validity
Aggravated
murder
statute
was
not
unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant;
statute was sufficiently clear to provide defendant
notice that his behavior in murdering the victim
and attempting to murder her boyfriend while
both were at the victim's house was prohibited, as
the terms "act," "scheme," "course of conduct,"
and "criminal episode" had common, easily
understood meanings. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.
14; West's U.C.A. $ 76-5-202(TW).

Sentencing and Punishment
#* Provision authorizing death penalty
Defendant lacked standing to argue on appeal that
the aggravated murder statute's alleged vagueness
exposed him to cruel and unusual punishment,
where defendant was not sentenced to death for
his crimes. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 8; West's
U.CA. $ 76-5-2Q2mfb).
1 Cases that cite this headnote

Criminal Law
#** Constitutional issues in general
The issue of whether a statute is constitutional
is a question of law, which the Supreme Court
reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the
trial court.
2 Cases that cite this headnote

2

Constitutional Law
#^ Homicide, mayhem, and assault with intent
to kill

Sentencing and Punishment
€— Aggravating or mitigating circumstances
The Eighth Amendment requires that statutory
aggravators channel the sentencefs discretion by
clear and objective standards that provide specific
and detailed guidance and that make rationally
reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of
death. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 8.

Criminal Law
#** Necessity of Objections in General
To prevail under plain error review, a defendant
must demonstrate that (1) an error exists; (2)
the error should have been obvious to the trial
court; and (3) the error is harmful, or, absent the

Sentencing and Punishment
w* Provision authorizing death penalty
In a case where the government does not seek
the death penalty or where the defendant is not
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sentenced to death, there can be no actual or
threatened injury caused by vagueness in the
death penalty statute that is sufficient to justify
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
statute under the Eighth Amendment. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 8.

When impaneling an anonymous jury, the
Supreme Court deems it wise that trial courts
exercise their discretion in a manner consistent
with the approach adopted by the federal courts,
which includes: (1) finding a compelling reason
to believe the jury needs protection from external
sources, and (2) taking reasonable precautions to
minimize any prejudicial effects on the defendant
and to ensure that the defendant's rights are
protected.

1 Cases that cite this headnote
7

Constitutional Law
#— Certainty and defmiteness: vagueness
In order to establish that statutes are so
vague that they violate due process, a
defendant must demonstrate either (1) that the
statutes do not provide the kind of notice
that enables ordinary people to understand
what conduct is prohibited, or (2) that the
statutes encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.

3 Cases that cite this headnote
11

mem T^peirrnntinn nnr\ i H p n t i t w n f t n r n r c

Courts typically rely on two general precautions
to minimize the prejudicial effects of an
anonymous jury: (1) ensuring a meaningful
voir dire to expose bias, and (2) offering jury
instructions designed to eliminate any implication
of the defendant's guilt.

1 Cases that cite this headnote
8

3 Cases that cite this headnote
9

Criminal Law
#^ Role and Obligations of Judge
Judges properly enjoy considerable latitude in
conducting the affairs of their courtroom so long
as courtroom procedures do not communicate
bias against the defendant.

10

3 Cases that cite this headnote

Criminal Law
#* Summoning and impaneling jury
Trial court's act of impaneling an anonymous jury
did not constitute plain error or require a new
murder trial; trial court had a compelling reason
to impanel an anonymous jury due to defendant's
involvement in organized crime, his past attempts
to interfere with the judicial process, and the fact
that extensive pretrial publicity could enhance the
possibility that the jurors names would become
public, and the trial court took precautions to
mitigate any potential prejudice to defendant.

Jury
<t«- Designation and identity of jurors

Jury

12

Criminal Law
i™ Homicide and assault with intent to kill
The State's remarks during closing arguments,
which stretched the evidence regarding whether
defendant's shooting of victim and victim's
boyfriend was incident to one act, scheme, course
of conduct, or criminal episode, did not constitute
prosecutorial misconduct, in prosecution for
aggravated murder and attempted aggravated
murder; defendant conceded in closing argument
that he killed victim and attempted to kill her
boyfriend, and evidence established that the
murder and attempted murder were part of one
act, scheme or course of conduct as defendant
showed up at the victim's home with a loaded gun,
he spoke with victim and her boyfriend and then
shot victim, victim's boyfriend attempted to flee
and defendant chased him and fired six shots at
him, hitting him once, and then he left the scene
and called the victim's father and informed him
that he had killed victim and was on his way to
father's house to "finish the job." West's U.C.A.
§ 76-5-202(1)0)).
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1 Cases that cite this headnote

13

Criminal Law
#» Conduct of counsel in general
If prosecutorial misconduct is established, the
State must show that the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.

14

1 Cases that cite this headnote

Criminal Law
#» Inferences from and Effect of Evidence

Opinion

Criminal Law
#** Scope of and Effect of Summing Up
Criminal Law
#» Inferences from and Effect of Evidence
Counsel for both sides have considerable latitude
in their closing arguments; they have the right to
fully discuss from their perspectives the evidence
and all inferences and deductions it supports.

16

Criminal Law
#•» Merger of offenses
Defendant's convictions for aggravated murder
and attempted aggravated murder merged, and
thus defendant could only be convicted of
aggravated murder; attempted murder was a
necessary element to prove the offense of
aggravated murder. (Per Durham, C.J., for a
majority of the court.) U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5:
West's U.C.A. $$ 76-1-402(3). 76-5-202.
1 Cases that cite this headnote

17

Attorneys and Law Firms
*629 Mark L. Shurtleff. Att'y Gen.. Matthew D. Bates. Asst.
Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, *630 Steven V. Major. William
McGuire. Farmington, for plaintiff.
Elizabeth Hunt. Salt Lake City, for defendant.

Appellate review of a prosecutor's conduct must
take into account that a prosecutor has the duty
and right to argue the case based on the total
picture shown by the evidence or the lack thereof.

15

knowing killing. (Per Durham, C.J., for a majority
of the court.) West's U.C.A. $ 76-5-202.

Homicide
#•» First Degree, Capital or Aggravated Murder
Aggravated murder, a capital crime, requires
proof of a statutorily defined aggravating
circumstance in addition to an intentional and

NEHRING. Justice:
If 1 Early on the morning of June 30, 2003, Trovon Ross
arrived at the front door of the home of his ex-girlfriend,
Annie Christensen. He carried a loaded gun. Mr. Ross entered
the home, and after an exchange of words with his exgirlfriend and her current boyfriend, James May, Mr. Ross
forced Ms. Christensen into a bedroom where he shot her
three times, killing her.
If 2 Mr. May made an attempt to flee in an automobile parked
in the garage. But after being intercepted by Mr. Ross, Mr.
May exited the car and took flight on foot. Mr. Ross chased
him out of the garage and down the street, firing six shots at
him. One shot struck Mr. May, wounding him.
Tf 3 Mr. Ross was apprehended following a chase. He was
charged and convicted of aggravated murder and attempted
aggravated murder. At Mr. Ross's trial, the sole issue in
contention was whether he should be convicted of murder or
aggravated murder. Mr. Ross now challenges his conviction
on the basis of four claims of error, only the first of which
was preserved at the trial court level. First, Mr. Ross alleges
he was convicted under an unconstitutional statute-Utah Code
section 76-5-202(1 )(b) (2003). Second, Mr. Ross contends
that his attempted aggravated murder conviction should
merge with his aggravated murder conviction. Third, Mr.
Ross asserts that the impaneling of an anonymous jury
was unfairly prejudicial. And fourth, Mr. Ross believes the
State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing
arguments, which affected the outcome of the case, requiring
a new trial. We reject Mr. Ross's first, third, and fourth claims;
however, the majority finds that the aggravated murder and
attempted aggravated murder charges should merge and
that the attempted aggravated murder conviction should be
vacated.
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_ _ _ _ _

BACKGROUND
U 4 Mr. Ross knocked on Ms. Christensen's door in Clinton,
Utah, at approximately 6:10 a.m. on June 30, 2003. Ms.
Christensen answered the door and let him in the house. Mr.
Ross waited in the front room while Ms. Christensen went to
her bedroom and returned with her boyfriend, Mr. May.
f 5 Mr. Ross began to interrogate Ms. Christensen about her
relationship with Mr. May, asking intimate questions about
their sexual activity. When Ms. Christensen did not respond
to Mr. Ross's questions, he pulled a gun from his waistline and
put the questions to Ms. Christensen again. Ms. Christensen
repeatedly asked Mr. Ross to leave, but he would not do so
until she answered his questions.
% 6 Mr. Ross then asked Mr. May, "Do you have any family
here?" Mr. May did not answer, and Mr. Ross responded,
"I can't let her hurt you like she hurt me." Mr. Ross then
grabbed Ms. Christensen, pointed the gun at her, and pushed
her past Mr. May toward the bedroom. Mr. May believed Mr.
Ross was going to kill both Ms. Christensen and him and,
apparently in an effort to dissuade Mr. Ross from following
through with his plan, told Mr. Ross that the Air Force would
be looking for him. Unimpressed, Mr. Ross pushed past Mr.
May and took Ms. Christensen to the bedroom.
f 7 Mr. May fled to the garage and entered his car. Soon
thereafter, he heard a gunshot, a pause, then two more
gunshots. Mr. May's car was equipped with an ignition
interlock device, requiring him to blow into a breathalyzer to
demonstrate that he was not intoxicated before his car would
start. He blew into the breathalyzer, but because his breathing
was "too erratic," the breathalyzer would not permit ignition.
If 8 Mr. Ross then appeared in the doorway to the garage. Mr.
May threw his keys out of the car, fled the garage, and began
to run down the street. Mr. Ross followed, firing six shots.
The second shot went through Mr. May's right arm and into
his chest, lodging itself under the skin in front of his ribs.
If 9 Still able to run despite his wound, Mr. May ran from
house to house searching for *631 assistance. He finally
managed to stop a car in the street, and the driver called the
police. An off-duty officer arrived, and Mr. May told him that
Ms. Christensen had been shot and directed the officer to her
house.
K 10 At least two of Ms. Christensen's neighbors heard the
gunfire and saw a white van back quickly out of her driveway,

hitting a mailbox before speeding off. The neighbors called
911 and reported the shots and the van's description. Clinton
City police arrived at Ms. Christensen's house within minutes
of the shooting and found her dead on the floor of her
bedroom. An examination of her body revealed three gunshot
wounds: one to the back right side of the head, one to the neck,
and one to the abdomen.
% 11 Meanwhile, at 6:20 that morning, Mr. Ross called Steven
Christensen, Ms. Christensen's father. Mr. Ross informed Mr.
Christensen that he had just killed his daughter and was "on
[his] way to [Mr. Christensen's] home to finish the job."
% 12 Several Clearfield City police officers heard the
broadcast of the van's description and headed toward the area
of the shooting. They passed the van en route, turned around,
and activated their lights and sirens, but Mr. Ross would
not pull over. The police eventually cornered Mr. Ross in a
cul-de-sac of a residential area and, after a brief foot chase,
arrested him.
If 13 The State charged Mr. Ross with aggravated murder,
attempted aggravated murder, and failure to obey an officer's
signal to stop. Mr. Ross was tried before a jury in November
2004. At trial, Mr. Ross did not contest his participation in
the crimes, but rather limited his efforts to persuading the
jury that he was not guilty of aggravated murder. Mr. Ross
contended that the killing of Ms. Christensen and the shooting
of Mr. May were not "committed incident to one act, scheme,
course of conduct, or criminal episode" under Utah Code
section 76-5-202(1 )(b) and thus did not amount to aggravated
murder.
1f 14 Concerned that the case might "generate substantial
public interest and media attention," the trial court impaneled
an anonymous jury "to protect the identity and privacy of
the jurors[ ] and to protect jurors, witnesses, and parties from
unnecessary commotion, confusion, or influence." The court
sought to preserve the jurors' anonymity by assigning each
of them a number by which they were identified during the
trial. The court informed jurors on more than one occasionboth verbally in the trial court proceedings and on the
jury questionnaire that each prospective juror completedthat the use of numbers was to protect their privacy and
to encourage jurors' candor during the voir dire process.
With one exception, each prospective juror was addressed
by both name and number during in-chamber interviews
conducted during the course ofjury selection. In four different
interviews, defense counsel referred to prospective jurors by
name, and the State did so three times.
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K 15 After a three-day trial, the jury convicted Mr. Ross of
aggravated murder and all other charges. Mr. Ross waived
his right to a jury in the penalty phase, and the State
recommended he serve life without parole for the aggravated
murder conviction. The court agreed and sentenced him to
concurrent prison terms of life without parole, five years to
life, and zero to five years.

I. UTAH CODE SECTION 76-5-202mfb) IS
NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE

3
4 U 20 We first address whether Utah Code section
76-5-202(1 Vb) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Mr.
Ross. Mr. Ross insists that the vagueness of the aggravated
murder statute does not measure up to the guarantees of
due process of law and freedom from the imposition of
U 16 Mr. Ross appealed.
cruel and unusual punishment enshrined in both the United
States Constitution and the Utah Constitution. First, we hold
STANDARD OF REVIEW
that because Mr. Ross was not sentenced to death, he lacks
standing to assert that the statute's vagueness exposed him to
I
2 H 17 Mr. Ross preserved only the first of his four
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment
issues raised on appeal. As Mr. Ross's constitutional claim
to the United States Constitution.. Next, we reach the merits
was preserved, we review that issue for correctness. Wood
of Mr. Ross's constitutional due process assaults on section
v. Univ. of Utah Med. Or.. 2002 UT 134. Tj 7. 67 P.3d 436.
76-5-202(1 )(b), but we find that the statute survives them
"The issue of whether a statute is constitutional is a question
because it is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Mr.
of law, which we review for correctness, giving no deference
Ross's conduct.
to the trial court." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Mr. Ross's other three claims were unpreserved, and
f 21 Section 76-5-202(1 ¥b) provides in pertinent part that
we review them for plain error. See State v. Pinder, 2005 UT
15. f 45. 114 P.3d 551: State v. Nelson-Waggoner. 2004 UT
[c]riminal homicide constitutes aggravated murder if the
29. H 16. 94 P.3d 186. To prevail under plain error review,
actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of
a defendant must demonstrate that " l(i) an error exists; (ii)
another ... [where] the homicide was committed incident
the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii)
to one act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode
the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable
during which two or more persons were killed, or during
likelihood of a more favorable outcome.'" *632 State v. Lee,
which the actor attempted to kill one or more persons in
2006 UT 5. T26. 128 P.3d 1179 (quoting State v. Hassan.
addition to the victim who was killed.
2004 UT 99. f 10. 108 P.3d 695).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)0)) (2003). According to Mr.
Ross, the vulnerable language of the statutory text is the
ANALYSIS
phrase "act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode."
Mr. Ross would have us conclude that this phrase is so vague
1f 18 With our standard of review in hand, we turn to
that the Constitution renders it void.
assessing the merits of Mr. Ross's four issues: (1) whether
the subsection of the Utah death penalty statute, under
1f 22 We do not reach the merits of Mr. Ross's Eighth
which Mr. Ross stands convicted, is unconstitutionally vague;
Amendment vagueness challenge because he does not have
(2) whether Mr. Ross's aggravated murder conviction and
standing to bring his claim. Like the Fourteenth Amendment,
attempted aggravated murder conviction should merge; (3)
the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment
whether the impaneling of an anonymous jury prejudiced
Clause prohibits vague statutes, but in this setting the Eighth
the jury against Mr. Ross; and (4) whether the alleged
Amendment will intercede only on behalf of defendants who
prosecutorial misconduct requires a new trial.
face the death penalty.
1f 19 This opinion contains the majority as to issues (1), (3),
and (4) and the dissent as to issue (2). The majority as to
issue (2) is contained in the separate opinion of Chief Justice
Durham, joined by Justice Durrant and Justice Parrish. The
dissenting view in section II of this opinion is that of Justice
Wilkins and me.

If 23 Mr. Ross takes issue with this proposition. His objection,
despite being off the mark, gives us cause to note the presence
of two separate strands of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
The first, and likely more familiar, is the proportionality
strand. These cases explore the relationship between offenses
and the severity of their resulting punishments. See generally
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Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. IK 20-28. 123 S.Ct.
1179. 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003) (reviewing Supreme Court
jurisprudence on the proportionality requirement of the
Eighth Amendment). The second strand of cases looks to the
Eighth Amendment as a basis upon which to insist that criteria
used by sentencers to impose the death penalty be employed
in a discriminating, principled way. The preeminent case in
this strand is Mavnardv. Cartwright. 486 U.S. 356. 362. 108
S.Ct. 1853.100 L.Ed.2d 372(1988). It is to this component of
the Eighth Amendment doctrine that Mr. Ross directs us when
he challenges the constitutionality of section 76-5-202(1 )(b).

to challenge sentences less than death. The Supreme Court
cases cited by Mr. Ross to make this point are, however, cases
culled from the proportionality strand of Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence that have nothing to do with the interpretation
and application of death penalty statutes.

7 t 27 While standing does not foreclose Mr. Ross's
remaining due process claims, we find none to be compelling.
In order to establish that statutes are so vague that they violate
due process, "a defendant must demonstrate either (1) that
the statutes do not provide 'the kind of notice that enables
ordinary people to understand what conduct [is prohibited],'
5 6 11 24 The Eighth Amendment requires that statutory or (2) that the statutes 'encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
aggravators "channel *633 the sentencer's discretion by
enforcement' " State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4.113. 84 P.3d
clear and objective standards that provide specific and
1171 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Honie. 2002 UT
detailed guidance and that make rationally reviewable the
4.t31.57P.3d977): see also Kolender v. Lawson. 461 U.S.
process for imposing a sentence of death." Godfrey v.
352. 357.103 S.Ct. 1855. 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983). And where,
Georgia. 446 U.S. 420. 428. 100 S.Ct. 1759. 64 L.Ed.2d
as here, a defendant's claim does not concern an alleged
398 (1980) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
infringement of a First Amendment right, the defendant must
Yet, "[t]o meet the standing requirements of Article III,
first show that the statute is vague as applied to his conduct,
'[a] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to
before he can attempt to show that the statute is vague in
the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be
all of its applications. State v. Green, 2004 UT 76. Tflf 44.
redressed by the requested relief.' " Houston v. Roe, 177
45 n. 15. 99 P.3d 820 (citing Hoffman Estates v. Flipside.
F.3d 901. 907 (9th Cir.1999) (quoting Allen v. Wright. 468
Hoffman Estates. Inc.. 455 U.S. 489.494-95. 102 S.Ct. 1186.
U.S. 737. 751. 104 S.Ct. 3315. 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984)).
71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982)). This means that a defendant may
Further, "[t]he injury must be distinct and palpable not
not complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to others
merely speculative, and the harm must be imminent and not
if its language affords the defendant adequate notice that his
hypothetical." Id. (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S.
conduct was proscribed. Id.
149. 155. 110 S.Ct. 1717. 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990)). In a case
1128 First, we find that the language of section 76-5-202(1 )(b)
where the government does not seek the death penalty or
is sufficiently clear to give Mr. Ross notice that the behavior
where the defendant is not sentenced to death, there can be no
he
engaged in was prohibited. The statute provides that a
actual or threatened injury caused by vagueness in the death
murder charge may be increased to aggravated murder if it is
penalty statute that is sufficient to justify standing. Id.
committed "incident to one act, scheme, course of conduct,
or criminal episode" where another murder is completed or
% 25 Our approach to Eighth Amendment challenges to
attempted. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1 )(b). Although we do
Utah's death penalty statute is in harmony with federal
not concede that the statute requires additional clarification to
jurisprudence on the topic as we, too, have denied standing
impart sufficient notice on those who might wish to modify
to a defendant not sentenced to death who, under the
their
conduct to avoid its application, we will nevertheless
Eighth Amendment, sought to challenge the vagueness of
point out several of its most obvious organizing features.
the aggravating circumstances set out in Utah's death penalty
To trigger section 76-5-202(1 )(b), additional murders or
statute. State v. Tuttle, 780P.2d 1203. 1215 (Utah 1989). Mr.
their attempts must be related in some way to one another.
Ross was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility
Close temporal proximity is the most apparent measure of
of parole. And like the defendant, Mr. Tuttle, Mr. Ross
linkage, as the phrase "incident to one act" suggests. Time
lacks standing to challenge the statute under the Eighth
is not the only possible connecting characteristic, *634
Amendment.
however, inasmuch as multiple murders or attempts incident
U 26 Mr. Ross appears to believe that our conclusion
to one "scheme" may occur over an extended period of time.
that Mr. Tuttle did not have standing because he was not
The relevant nexus connoted by "scheme" is a plan that
sentenced to death was wrong because the United States
targets multiple victims. See State v. Bradshaw, 2006 UT 87.
Supreme Court has made the Eighth Amendment available
TH[ 12-16. 152 P.3d 288 (discussing when multiple related
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acts may constitute a single scheme in the communications
fraud context). A single "course of conduct" implies a more
lengthy duration than an "act" and a lesser emphasis on
planning than a "scheme," but nevertheless, the term includes
elements of both act and scheme. One "criminal episode"
is, like "scheme," not particularly temporally dependent, but
rather appears to address even otherwise random murders
or attempts committed while the defendant is undertaking
another criminal activity. Contrary to what Mr. Ross suggests,
the terms "act," "scheme," "course of conduct," and "criminal
episode" have common, generally understood meanings.
And where statutory terms are "readily ascertainable," the
vagueness doctrine does not require a legislature to redefine
them. See MacGuire. 2004 UT 4. ^ 31. 84 P.3d 1171.
% 29 Moreover, the statutory terms acquire greater clarity
when considered in the context of the whole provision..
The individual terms are shaped and their definitional
contours sharpened through comparisons and contrasts to
their companions. Thus, the clarity of the whole of the statute
is greater than the sum of its individual parts. The individual
terms "act," "scheme," "course of conduct," and "criminal
episode," taken together in context of the statute, indicate
a requirement that the foundational act (a murder) and the
aggravating act (a second murder or an attempted murder)
be linked by a degree of commonality. Whether time, place,
manner, purpose, or a combination of the four serve to link
the foundational act to the aggravating act for the purpose of
this statute, it is clear that the statute requires that there be
some indicia that separate acts are parts of a whole.
U 30 Stated most simply, section 76-5-202(1 )(b) applies to
murders or attempts linked by time, place, or purpose. It is
clear to us that the statute would fully communicate to Mr.
PvOss, as he stood armed with jealous rage and a pistol, waiting
for Ms. Christensen to answer her door early on the morning
of June 30, that what could transpire in the ensuing minutes
could well be crimes and tragedies incident to one criminal
episode or course of conduct.
U 31 Mr. Ross killed Ms. Christensen and attempted to
kill Mr. May in a sequence of events closely linked by
ail three elements of time, place, and purpose. A simple
timeline of events illustrates how closely related in time,
place, and purpose Mr. Ross's actions were: Mr. Ross drove
to Ms. Christensen's home; he rang the doorbell, entered Ms.
Christensen's home, and questioned her and Mr. May; he
forced Ms. Christensen into her bedroom and shot and killed
her with three bullets; he found Mr. May in the garage, chased
after him, and fired six bullets, injuring Mr. May with the

iAfes--ti^**,,fkl« l \#
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second shot; he called Ms. Christensen's father, told him that
he had just killed his daughter, and that he was on his way to
Mr. Christensen's home to "finish the job"; and finally, while
still driving, he was apprehended by the police. All of this
occurred between 6:00 a.m. and 7:00 a.m.
Tf 32 The trial evidence-most prominently Mr. Ross's
interrogation of Ms. Christensen regarding the recent sexual
activity of Ms. Christensen and Mr. May-leaves little doubt
that Mr. Ross's jealousy and anger over Ms. Christensen's
spurning of his affections impelled him to appear at Ms.
Christensen's door. We have little difficulty matching the
terms "course of conduct" and "criminal episode" to the
murder and attempted murder that Mr. Ross committed within
the span of less than one hour, motivated by his jealousy and
rage. It may be that, at the boundaries, the statute is unclear
about when two or more separate acts are part of a single
whole. But this is not a boundary case. The statute, therefore,
is constitutional as applied to Mr. Ross.

II. MR. ROSS'S ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED
MURDER CONVICTION SHOULD NOT MERGE
WITH HIS AGGRAVATED MURDER CONVICTION
Tf 33 We next take up Mr. Ross's claim that the trial court
committed plain error when it -635 permitted the jury
to convict him of both aggravated murder and attempted
aggravated murder, instead of merging the two convictions
into a single crime. Although I do not hold the majority on
this issue, I would find that no error occurred because Utah
Code section 76-5-202 is an enhancement statute; the two
convictions therefore should not merge.
If 34 Mr. Ross contends that merger was mandated because
the attempted murder charge was a necessary predicate to, and
a lesser included offense of, the aggravated murder charge.
Utah Code section 76-1-402(3) permits greater and lesser
included offenses to merge. An offense is "lesser included"
and eligible for merger when "[i]t is established by proof
of the same or less than all the facts required to establish
the commission of the [greater] offense charged...." Utah
Code Ann. § 76-l-402(3Xa) (2003). We have interpreted this
provision to mean that "where the two crimes are 'such that
the greater cannot be committed without necessarily having
committed the lesser,' then as a matter of law they stand in the
relationship of greater and lesser offenses, and the defendant
cannot be convicted or punished for both." State v. Hill, 614
P.2d 96.97 (Utah 1983) (quoting State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152.
156 (Utah 1983)). Although merger is codified in statute, it
has a constitutional pedigree as it provides a means to prevent
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violations of constitutional double jeopardy protection. State
v. Smith. 2005 UT 57.17. 122 P.3d 615.
TJ 35 A criminal statute is freed from double jeopardy
concerns and exempted from the merger requirements in
Utah Code section 76-1-402(3) if it is clear from the "plain
language and structure" of the pertinent provision that the
statute is an enhancement statute, i.e., that the legislature
"intended to enhance the penalty for one type of offense
when certain characteristics are present that independently
constitute a different offense." Id. 1f 11. Enhancement statutes
differ from other criminal statutes by singling out "particular
characteristics of criminal conduct as warranting harsher
punishment." Id. ^ 10 (citing State v. McCovev. 803 P.2d
1234, 1237 (Utah 1990)). But "if the legislature intends
to preclude [a statute] from requiring merger in a specific
instance, it must clearly indicate that the provision in question
is intended to enhance the penalty for one type of offense
when certain characteristics are present that independently
constitute a different offense." Id. f 11.
% 36 In Smith, we held Utah Code section 76-10-504(3) to be
an enhancement provision because it enhances "the penalty
for the offense of carrying a concealed firearm when the
offense is committed in conjunction with a crime of violence,
a separate offense." Id. *[f 13. We found it relevant that the
statute enumerated various levels of offenses depending on
the type of weapon involved and on the circumstances in
which carrying a concealed weapon occurs. Id.
^f 37 Our experience in assessing the characteristics of an
enhancement statute in Smith serves us well here. While
Utah Code section 76-5-202 lacks the clear-cut "graduated
punishment scale" of Utah Code section 76-10-504(3), it
unmistakably enhances "criminal homicide" to "aggravated
murder" when the murder is committed in conjunction with .
one of the several enumerated aggravating circumstances,
some of which constitute separate, independent crimes.
Section 76-5-202 does not define aggravated murder by
setting out a set of elements unique to that offense. Rather,
the statute provides that murder should be enhanced to
aggravated murder when a homicide is accompanied by one
of several listed aggravators. Specifically, the aggravating
circumstance at issue here requires that murder be enhanced
to aggravated murder if the murder is committed incident
to a single "act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal
episode ... during which the actor attempted to kill one or
more persons in addition to the victim who was killed."
Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-202(1 )(b). The purpose and effect
of this language-dictated by the plain language and structure

of the statute-is to enhance the degree of punishment for
the murder because it was committed in conjunction with
an attempted murder, a separate offense. Thus, the structure
of section 76-5-202 demonstrates to our satisfaction that its
purpose is to single out circumstances that merit a greater
degree of "636 punishment for murder than that otherwise
provided for perpetrators of criminal homicide. The statute is,
therefore, an enhancement statute not subject to the merger
doctrine. The trial court did not err when it permitted the jury
to convict Mr. Ross of both aggravated murder and attempted
aggravated murder.
U 38 The majority takes issue with this assessment and asserts
that under Utah Code section 76-1-402(3) the attempted
murder and the aggravated murder charges against Mr. Ross
should be merged. Pointing to State v. Shaffer. 725 P.2d 1301
(Utah 1986). and State v. Wood 868 P.2d 70 (Utah 1993).
overruled on other grounds by State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d
1144 (Utah 1996). the majority contends that this court has
already found that the merger doctrine applies to Utah Code
section 76-5-202, the aggravated murder statute. I am neither
persuaded that we have, nor that we should.
\ 39 It is true that we held in both Shaffer and Wood that
the underlying aggravating crime should merge with the
aggravated murder charge. What we did not discuss in either
case was whether section 76-5-202 was an enhancement
statute and, thus, exempt from the merger requirements. In
Smith, we emphasized the need to determine whether a statute
was an enhancement statute as a necessary third step in the
merger analysis: "In McCovey, however, this court in effect
added a third step to the [merger] analysis, holding that
in cases where the legislature intended a statute to be an
enhancement statute, the merger doctrine set forth in section
76-1-402(3) does not apply." 2005 UT 57. ^ 9. 122 P.3d
615 (citing McCovev. 803 P.2d at 1237). Because neither
Shaffer nor Wood mentions section 76-5-202 in the context
of enhancement, - those cases do not control our decision
on the enhancement question. And because my decision rests
on our determination that, under Smith, section 76-5-202 is
an enhancement statute, I am not troubled by Shaffer's and
Wood's holdings that section 76-5-202 meets the first two of
the three steps in a merger analysis.

III. THE IMPANELING OF AN ANONYMOUS
JURY DOES NOT REQUIRE A NEW TRIAL
8 % 40 We next consider whether the trial court committed
plain error when it impaneled an anonymous jury. We
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conclude that the trial court was justified in believing it
confronted a need to protect the jury from media exposure
and that this concern could be effectively addressed by
impaneling an anonymous jury. We further conclude that the
trial court implemented reasonable and workable precautions
to ensure that Mr. Ross was not prejudiced by the decision to
refer to jurors by number instead of by name.
% 41 Our task of considering whether or not it is appropriate
to impanel an anonymous jury is an issue of first impression
for this court. The absence of any direction from our appellate
courts on the subject of anonymous juries is reason enough
to overcome an unpreserved issue for which review is sought
based on plain error since a trial court could hardly be faulted
for failing to take note of jurisprudence that does not exist.
See State v. Ross. 951 P.2d 236. 239 (Utah CtApp. 1997V
Still, if the trial judge should have apprehended that by
impaneling an anonymous jury he would prejudice Mr. Ross
or if the trial court had impaneled the anonymous jury in a
manner that resulted in prejudice, we could reach the merits
and, if appropriate, provide a remedy by invoking the plain
error exception to our preservation requirement, even in the
absence of clear Utah precedent on the matter. We do not
believe that the trial judge plainly erred in this instance.
But because there is no present guidance for trial courts on
this question, we take this opportunity first to outline the
principles that should guide a trial court when faced with the
issue of whether and how to impanel an anonymous jury and
then *63 7 to note that this trial judge acted well within those
parameters.
f 42 We would not, however, liberally exercise our authority
to intercede to undo a trial judge's decision to impanel an
anonymous jury because that decision is highly fact intensive
and well within the scope of a trial judge's discretionary
powers. See State v. Samonte, 83 Hawai'i 507. 928 P.2d
1. 17 (1996). It is a decision that requires a trial judge to
draw on the training and temperament that form the very
core of judging and is therefore a decision that is entitled
to deferential treatment by a reviewing court. See State v.
Bowles. 530 N.W.2d 521. 531 (Minn. 1995V

reasonable precautions to minimize any prejudicial effects on
the defendant and to ensure that the defendant's rights are
protected. See, e.g., State v. Brown. 280 Kan. 65. 118 P.3d
1273. 1279 (2005).
Tf 44 While the trial court in this case did not have the benefit
of precedent from this court, we believe that it impaneled an
anonymous jury appropriately and, in fact, adhered closely
to the principles reflected in these two guidelines. First, the
trial court had a compelling reason to impanel an anonymous
jury. Compelling reasons for impaneling an anonymous jury
include: (1) the defendant's involvement in organized crime;
(2) the defendant's participation in a group with the capacity to
harm jurors; (3) the defendant's past attempts to interfere with
the judicial process; (4) the potential that, if convicted, the
defendant will suffer a lengthy incarceration and substantial
monetary penalties; and (5) extensive publicity that could
enhance the possibility that the jurors' names become public
and expose them to intimidation or harassment. Id.; see
also United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507. 1520 (11th
Cir.1994); United States v, Coonan. 664 F.Supp. 861. 862
(S.D.N.Y.1987): Samonte. 928 P.2d at 14.
1f 45 The trial court presiding over Mr. Ross's trial impaneled
an anonymous jury because of the threat of extensive
publicity about the case. As our factual narrative amply
demonstrates, this was a crime that featured an embittered
ex-lover, a gruesome killing, a suspenseful escape, a police
chase, and an abundance of other elements that made the trial
an irresistible media event. The trial court's desire to protect
the jurors' privacy and its concern about how significant
media attention might jeopardize the ability of the jury to do
its work justified its decision to opt for an anonymous jury.

11 % 46 The trial court also took precautions to mitigate any
potential prejudice that the defendant might suffer as a result
of being tried before an anonymous jury. Courts typically
rely on two general precautions to minimize the prejudicial
effects of an anonymous jury: (1) ensuring a meaningful
voir dire to expose bias and (2) offering jury instructions
designed to eliminate any implication of the defendant's guilt.
Samonte. 928 P.2d at 13-14: State v. Ford. 539 N.W.2d 214.
9
10 % 43 Judges properly enjoy considerable latitude 221 (Minn. 1995): Bowles, 530 N.W.2d at 530. The trial court
here-again unaided by any precedent from this court-took
in conducting the affairs of their courtroom so long as
each of these precautions to ensure that Mr. Ross was not
courtroom procedures do not communicate bias against the
unfairly prejudiced.
defendant. When impaneling an anonymous jury, we deem
it wise that trial courts exercise their discretion in a manner
f 47 Effective voir dire, one in which counsel and the
consistent with the approach adopted by the federal courts,
trial court are able to fully explore and expose bias, is a
which includes (1) finding a compelling reason to believe the
powerful antidote to any prejudice, including that which
jury needs protection from external sources and (2) taking
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might result from an anonymous jury. Samonte, 928 P.2d at
15-16. Ensuring that jury anonymity does not interfere with
the opportunity to conduct a meaningful voir dire, therefore,
is critical.
\ 48 In this case, voir dire was meaningful, with measures
taken to expose the biases of the jurors. In addition to the jury
questionnaire, the court asked some follow-up questions in
private interviews concerning specific answers the potential
jurors provided in the questionnaires. It asked them about
their feelings regarding the death penalty and whether they
"could be fair to both prosecution *638 and defense on
the issue of punishment." The court informed the jurors that
"the defendant is presumed innocent and all presumptions
of law are in favor of his innocence." Finally, it told them
that "the defendant is never required to prove his innocence."
This effective voir dire mitigated any prejudice that Mr. Ross
might have suffered from being tried before an anonymous
juryK 49 To further reduce the risk of prejudice, a trial court
should instruct jurors in a way that recognizes the threat
that an anonymous jury poses to a defendant's presumption
of innocence. This may be accomplished in many ways,
including, for example, taking care to avoid calling attention
to the anonymity of the jury or otherwise suggesting that,
owing to its uniqueness, jury anonymity is reserved for a trial
of particularly heinous crimes or dangerous and obviously
guilty defendants. Among instructions emphasizing the
presumption of innocence, "[t]he trial court should give
anonymous jurors a plausible and nonprejudicial reason for
not disclosing their identities that decreases the probability
that the jurors would infer that the defendant is guilty or
dangerous." Samonte, 928 P.2d at 16. For example, a court
might instruct anonymous jurors that "the purpose for juror
anonymity is to protect the jurors from contacts by the news
media, thereby implying that juror anonymity is not the result
of threats from the criminal defendant." Id.
T| 50 In this case, the trial judge met every reasonable
expectation we could impose on him to send the jury into
its deliberations free of any sense that their anonymity
somehow implied that Mr. Ross was guilty. Specifically, the
trial court advised the jurors, on more than one occasion,
that their anonymity was to protect their privacy and
to encourage their candor during the voir dire process.
Further, the court explained in its decorum order that
another purpose of anonymity was to shield the jurors from
potential media harassment. This order offered jurors a
plausible and nonprejudicial explanation for why they were

impaneled anonymously, which reduced the possibility that
they believed their anonymity was tied to Mr. Ross's guilt or
dangerous nature.
1} 51 Additionally, jurors should have known from in-chamber
interviews that their anonymity was primarily for privacy
and protection from the media, not from Mr. Ross. With one
exception, each prospective juror was addressed by both name
and number during in-chamber interviews. In four different
interviews, defense counsel referred to prospective jurors by
name, and the State did so three times.
% 52 In sum, the trial court did not plainly err in impaneling
an anonymous jury. It had sufficient cause to do so, including
the need to protect the jury from the media and to encourage
candor during the voir dire process. The court also took
reasonable precautions to minimize prejudicial effects on
Mr. Ross by ensuring a thorough voir dire process and by
providing a plausible and nonprejudicial explanation for the
jurors' anonymity.

IV. THE STATED REMARKS DID NOT
CONSTITUTE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT,
AND TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE
TO OBJECT DID NOT CONSTITUTE
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
12
If 53 Finally, we consider whether the State's
remarks during closing arguments constitute prosecutorial
misconduct. Applying our plain error standard of review, we
hold that they do not. Even if the statements made by the State
during closing arguments were not all fair inferences drawn
from the evidence proffered during trial, they were harmless
in the face of the overwhelming evidence of Mr. Ross's guilt.
Therefore, it was not plain error for the trial court not to have
intervened when the State stretched evidence regarding the
only disputed point in the case-whether Mr. Ross's shooting
of Ms. Christensen and Mr. May was incident to "one act,
scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode" under Utah
Code section 76-5-202(1 )(b) (2003).

<

(

13 ^ 54 This court set forth the test for prosecutorial
misconduct in State v. Valdez, stating:
*639 The test of whether the remarks made by counsel
. are so objectionable as to merit a reversal in a criminal
case is, did the remarks call to the attention of the jurors
matters which they would not be justified in considering
in determining their verdict, and were they, under the
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circumstances of the particular case, probably influenced
by those remarks.
30 Utah 2d 54. 513 P.2d 422. 426 (1973). This two-part test
must be applied "under the circumstances of the particular
case." State v. Troy. 688 P.2d 483. 486 (Utah 1984). In
assessing the second component of the test, " '[i]f proof
of defendant's guilt is strong, the challenged conduct or
remark will not be presumed prejudicial.' " Id. (quoting State
v. Seeger. 4 Or.App. 336. 479 P.2d 240. 241 (1971)). If
prosecutorial misconduct is established, the State must show
that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State
v. Eaton. 569 P.2d 1114. 1116 (Utah 1977).

not "much doubt, in view of the evidence that [he] killed
Ms. Christensen, and that he attempted to kill Mr. May." The
question then became whether "the homicide was committed
incident to one act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal
episode ... during which [Mr. Ross] attempted to kill one or
more persons in addition to the victim who was killed." Utah
Code Ann. $76-5-202(1 )(b).

1158 As we indicated in section I of our analysis, there is ample
evidence in the record to demonstrate that the murder of
Ms. Christensen and the attempted murder of Mr. May were,
indeed, two parts of a single "act, scheme, course of conduct,
or criminal episode." Specifically, the evidence shows that
Mr.
Ross showed up at Ms. Christensen's *640 home with
14
15 Tf 55 Our review of a prosecutor's conduct must
a loaded, concealed handgun. After speaking to both Ms.
also take into account that "[a] prosecutor has the duty and
Christensen and Mr. May, Mr. Ross took Ms. Christensen
right to argue the case based on the 'total picture shown by
into the bedroom and shot her. Mr. Ross proceeded directly
the evidence or the lack thereof " State v. Hales, 652 P.2d
to
the garage, where Mr. May was attempting to flee. Mr.
1290. 1291 (Utah 1982) (quoting State v. Kazda. 540 P.2d
Ross chased Mr. May out of the garage and fired six shots at
949.951 (Utah 1975)). Furthermore, "[qounsei for both sides
him, injuring him with one of the shots. Mr. Ross then called
have considerable latitude in their closing arguments. They
Ms. Christensen's father and told him that he had just shot
have the right to fully discuss from their perspectives the
his daughter and that he was on his way to Mr. Christensen's
evidence and all inferences and deductions it supports." State
home to finish the job. The evidence that the murder and
v. Dibello. 780 P.2d 1221. 1225 (Utah 1989): see also State
the attempted murder were part of a single "act, scheme,
v. Laffertv. 749 P.2d 1239. 1255 (Utah 1988).
course of conduct, or criminal episode" is strong, even absent
f 56 The State did, in fact, seize a sizeable portion of
the questionable statements made by the prosecution in its
latitude during closing arguments in recounting the events
closing arguments. The doctrine of prosecutorial misconduct,
surrounding the death of Ms. Christensen. For example, the
therefore, does not apply, and it was not plain error for the
State implied that Mr. Ross ordered both Ms. Christensen
trial court not to have intervened.
and Mr. May back to the bedroom, but Mr. May actually
testified that Mr. Ross only pushed Ms. Christensen toward
CONCLUSION
the bedroom. - Also, the State reminded the jury that Mr.
May said "very few seconds" elapsed between the time when
^ 59 In conclusion, we hold that Utah Code section
Mr. Ross killed Ms. Christensen and when he approached
76-5-202(1 )(b) is not unconstitutionally vague since the plain
Mr. May in the garage and began shooting at him. Mr. May,
meaning of the statutory terminology provides sufficient
however, gave no specific time frame for the sequence of the
notice of the prohibited conduct. We also hold that the
impaneling of an anonymous jury, under the circumstances
events.- The jury could infer from these remarks that the
of this case, does not require a new trial, particularly where
attempt to kill Mr. May was part of the same "act, scheme,
the trial court took necessary precautions to ensure that
course of conduct, or criminal episode" as the murder of
this procedure was not unfairly prejudicial to Mr. Ross.
Ms. Christensen, which was required to convict Mr. Ross of
Finally, the State's remarks during closing arguments did
aggravated murder.
not constitute prosecutorial misconduct given the weight of
^f 57 While these two remarks were questionable-especially
evidence against Mr. Ross. We therefore affirm Mr. Ross's
considering that they bear on the main issue in the case of
convictions for aggravated murder. The majority finds that
whether or not Mr. Ross was guilty of murder or aggravated
Mr. Ross's aggravated murder conviction and his attempted
murder-they were also harmless given the weight of evidence
aggravated murder conviction should merge and vacates his
against Mr. Ross. Proof of Mr. Ross's guilt is strong in this
attempted aggravated murder conviction.
case. In fact, at trial, Mr. Ross conceded in closing argument
that he did not dispute the State's evidence and that there was
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70. 90 (Utah 1993). overmled on other grounds by State v.
% 60 Associate Chief Justice WILKINS concurs in Justice
NEHRING's opinion.
DURHAM. Chief Justice, writing for the majority:
16 1| 61 According to this court's precedent, an underlying
felony that constitutes the aggravating circumstance merges
with the conviction for aggravated murder pursuant to Utah
Code section 76-5-202. Therefore, it was impermissible
for the trial court to allow convictions to stand for both
aggravated murder and attempted aggravated murder when
the attempted murder of Mr. May was the only aggravating
factor presented to the jury.

Mirauet 914 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1996V1 Since Shaffer and
Wood were decided, the legislature has not modified the
provisions of Utah Code section 76-5-202 in any manner
that would alter our analysis. Compare Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-202 (2003). with id g 76-5-202 (Supp.1993), and id
§ 76-5-202 (Supp. 1986). Although the legislature has added
new aggravating factors and affirmative defenses, it has done
nothing to "clearly indicate that the provision... is intended to
enhance the penalty for [murder] when certain characteristics
are present." State v. Smith 2005 UT 57. f 11. 122 P.3d
615. We have previously stated that such explicit indication
is required, id., and the legislature has had ample opportunity
to exempt aggravated murder from the doctrine of merger
by amending the statute to clearly indicate that it is intended
to operate only as an enhancement provision. "[T]he court
has no power to rewrite a statute to make it conform to an
intention not expressed." State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234.
1240 (Utah 1990) (Durham, J., dissenting) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Absent action by the legislature, Shaffer and
Wood are still good law, and the dissent's effort to read section
76-5-202 as an enhancement statute is improper absent clear

17 TJ 62 Aggravated murder, a capital crime, "requires proof
of a statutorily defined aggravating circumstance in addition
to an intentional and knowing killing." State v. Shaffer, 725
P.2d 1301. 1313 (Utah 1986). In the instant case, the sole
aggravating circumstance presented to the jury was whether
"the homicide was committed incident to one act, scheme,
course of conduct, or criminal episode ... during which the
actor attempted to kill one or more persons in addition to the
legislative action. victim who was killed." Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-202(1 )(b)
(2003). Proof of the attempted murder of Mr. May served
Tf 65 The aggravating circumstance in this case was the
as the aggravating circumstance allowing for Mr. Ross's
attempted murder. Like the predicate felonies in Shaffer and
conviction for capital murder.
Wood, when the aggravating circumstance is a crime, it must
merge with the greater offense if no other independent ground
^ 63 The merger doctrine, derived from the Fifth
Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause, prevents a defendant
from being convicted of "both the offense charged and the
included offense." Utah Code Ann. 8 76-1-402(3) (2003 &
Supp.2007). An offense is included when "[i]t is established
by proof of the same or less than all the facts required
to establish the commission of the offense charged." Id. §
76-1-402(3 )(a). In the case before us, where the attempted
murder of Mr. May was the sole aggravating factor presented
to the jury, the attempted murder is a lesser included offense
of the aggravated murder. Proof of the facts of the attempted
murder were necessary to establish the commission of the
aggravated murder.

1f 66 Mr. Ross could have been convicted of murder and
attempted murder. When the jury convicted Mr. Ross for
aggravated murder, the attempted murder of Mr. May, a
necessary element to prove the aggravated murder, merged
with the capital felony. Accordingly, Mr. Ross could be
convicted of only aggravated murder.

If 64 On more than one occasion, this court has determined
that the merger doctrine applies to Utah Code section
76-5-202. In State v. Shaffer, we held that aggravated robbery
merged with aggravated murder when robbery was the sole
aggravating circumstance for the capital murder conviction.
725 P.2d at 1313. Similarly, in State v. Wood, we held that
the predicate offense of aggravated sexual assault merged
with the conviction for aggravated murder. *641 868 P.2d

1} 67 We affirm the conviction for aggravated murder and
vacate the conviction for attempted aggravated murder. The
practical effect of this decision is that Mr. Ross will serve
one life sentence without the possibility of parole instead of
two. See State v. Hill. 61A P.2d 96. 98 (Utah 1983) ("[I]t is
appropriate to regard the conviction on the lesser offense as
mere surplusage, which does not invalidate the conviction and
sentence on the greater offense.").

exists to raise the charge to aggravated murder. - To allow
the attempted murder charge to be used as the sole means of
aggravation and as its own separate offense permits double
counting of the offense in violation of double jeopardy and
the merger doctrine.
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K 68 Justice DURRANT and Justice PARRISH concur in
Chief Justice DURHAM'S opinion.
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Footnotes
1
We decided Shaffer before we added the third step in the merger analysis in McCovey. And in Wood, which was decided
after McCovey but before we further clarified our McCovey holding in Smith, the question of whether section 76-5-202 was an
enhancement statute was not raised as an issue and we, consequently, did not discuss it.
2
In closing arguments, the State said, "[Mr. Ross] doesn't order just [Ms. Christensen] back to that bedroom. He orders Mr. May back
to the bedroom as well. He starts them back to the bedroom." Mr. May actually testified that Mr. Ross grabbed Ms. Christensen's arm
and pushed her toward the bedroom. After another exchange, Mr. Ross pushed past Mr. May and, again, pushed Ms. Christensen
to the bedroom.
3
Although Mr. May said that he heard the shots that killed Ms. Christensen while he was trying to start his car and that "the next
thing I noticed I was looking up and there he was right in the doorway," he never testified that "very few seconds" elapsed.
1
In Wood, the aggravating circumstance that the murder was heinous and depraved was not treated as a separate aggravating
circumstance because "the heinousness and depravity arose directly out of the aggravated sexual assault.... [T]he heinousness and
the [sexual assault] were the same factually and should be treated legally for merger purposes as one aggravating circumstance."
868 P.2d at 90.
2
Even absent our precedent, the aggravated murder statute does not evidence a "graduated punishment scale ... indicative of an
enhancement statute." Smith, 2005 UT 57, T[ 3, 122 P.3d 615 (internal quotation marks omitted). In Smith, the concealed weapon
statute at issue listed circumstances in which carrying a concealed weapon could be either a class B misdemeanor, a class A
misdemeanor, or a second degree felony. Id. ^ 12. The structure of section 76-5-202 is unlike that at issue in Smith; all aggravated
murders are capital felonies.
3^
See State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 367 (Utah 1993) (recognizing that a "defendant could be convicted of a crime that might also serve
as the basis for an aggravating circumstance if the prosecution did not rely on that crime for proof of the aggravating circumstance,"
and on that basis holding that the theft conviction did not merge with the first degree murder conviction under Utah Code section
76-5-202).
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080700641 STATE OF UTAH

SECOND
DISTRICT COURT

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TROVON DONTA ROSS,
D^^^^x**,-.-^
XCUU'-'HU;

VS.

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.

RULING ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
DEFAULT
Case No. 080700641
Judge Rodney S. Page

COMES NOW the Court on the respondent's motion for summary judgment and the
petitioner's motion for default. Having reviewed the moving and responding papers, and the
materials submitted in support thereof, determined that a hearing is unnecessary for the Court's
rulings, and being fully advised in the premises, the Court GRANTS the respondent's motion for
summary judgment and DENIES the petitioner's motion for default.

BACKGROUND
On October 24, 2004, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to
the Utah Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-9-101 et seq. and Rule 65C of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the petitioner did not submit a supporting
memorandum detailing the factual basis and legal argument relevant to the claims within his
petition. Instead, the petitioner filed a motion for discovery. Subsequently, on November 6,
2008, and following a review of the petitioner's affidavit and application for waiver of fees
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submitted concurrent with his petition, the Court found the petitioner indigent and provided him
with notice of the initial partial filing fee associated with the filing of his petition. See Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-2-306(l). The Court also notified the petitioner that it could not proceed with his
petition until he paid the assessed initial partial filing fee. See Id, at § 78A-2-306(2).
On November 28, 2008, the Court received the petitioner's initial partial filing fee, but
still had not received the petitioner's supporting memorandum. Thereafter, on January 5, 2009,
the Court again informed the petitioner that it would not proceed in reviewing his petition for
frivolity, pursuant to Rule 65C(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, until receiving his
supporting memorandum. In response, the petitioner filed a second motion for discovery on
January 22, 2009. This motion prompted the Court to issue a ruling on January 29, 2009, which
denied the petitioner's motions for discovery, finding that such motions were premature under
Rule 65C(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. On the same day, the Court also entered a
i

finding of deficiency regarding the petitioner's claims and directed him to file an amended
statement of facts and supporting memorandum. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(g)(3). Thereafter, on
February 3, 2009, the petitioner filed a memorandum in support of his petition, and on February
11,2009, the petitioner filed an amended statement of facts regarding his post-conviction claims.
Accordingly, the Court reviewed the petition for post-conviction relief and its supporting
materials for frivolity, pursuant to Rule 65C(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

<

On April 9, 2009, the Court issued an order of partial dismissal and requiring
respondent's pleading, pursuant to Rule 65C(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Within this
I
order, the Court noted that it had reviewed the petition for post-conviction relief, the amended
statement of facts and the petitioner's supporting memorandum, and, without reaching the merits
of the petitioner's claims, determined that each of the claims appeared frivolous on their face
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with the exception of the petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate
counsel pertaining to an alleged failure to raise the "extreme emotional distress" affirmative
defense to aggravated murder set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(4) (2002).! Specifically,
the Court grouped the petitioner's several claims into four (4) categories: (1) claims of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (2) claims of prosecutorial misconduct at trial; (3) claims
for violation of double jeopardy; and (4) claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
Based on the materials submitted by the petitioner, which included a copy of the Utah Supreme
Court ruling on his direct appeal, see State v. Ross, 174 P.3d 628 (Utah 2007), the Court found
that with the aforementioned exceptions the petitioner's claims clearly appeared frivolous on
their face, as the claims were either raised or addressed at trial or on appeal, or could have been
but were not raised at trial or on appeal.2 The Court then directed the respondent to file a
responsive pleading to the petitioner's two (2) surviving claims.
Subsequently, on April 23, 2009, the petitioner filed a motion to appoint counsel. The
Court denied this motion by written ruling dated April 24, 2009,findingthat under the
circumstances the motion was premature, as the Post-Conviction Remedies Act contemplates the
necessity of an evidentiary hearing before the Court determines whether counsel is necessary for
1

In 2009, the Utah State Legislature amended Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(4) by deleting subsection (i), which
stated in relevant part the affirmative defense: "under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is
a reasonable explanation or excuse." The current version of the statute provides an affirmative defense based on: "a
reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal justification or excuse for the conduct although the conduct
was not legally justifiable or excusable under the existing circumstances." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(4) (2009).
The Court notes that the petitioner's claims at issue pertain to the version of the statute applicable at the time of his
trial in 2004. Accordingly, this Ruling's references to § 76-5-202(4) pertain to the 2002 version of the statute, not
the statute's 2009 version.
2
See Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(g); see also Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(l); see also Hutchings v. State, 84 P.3d 1150,
1152-53 (Utah 2003) ("Section [78B-9-106(l)] precludes a petitioner from seeking relief on any ground that was
raised or addressed at trial or on appeal or that could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal. ...
Proceedings in all petitions for relief filed under the Post Conviction Remedies Act are governed by rule 65 C of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 65C contemplates section [78B-9-106] by providing for summary dismissal of
claims that have already been addressed by the court. Subparagraph (g)(1) of the rule directs the assigned judge to
review the petition, and if it is apparent to the court that any claim has been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if
any claim appears frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim .... Proceedings
on the claim shall terminate with the entry of the order of dismissal.") (Emphasis in original) (Internal quotations
and citations omitted).
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the proper adjudication of a petitioner's claims.3 The Court, however, granted the petitioner leave
to renew his motion to appoint counsel at a more appropriate time in the proceedings.
Then, on July 13, 2009, and following the Court's granting two (2) requests for
extensions of time, the respondent served its motion for summary judgment. In its accompanying
supporting memorandum, the respondent argued that the petitioner's surviving claim for
ineffective assistance of trial counsel is procedurally barred, as the petitioner could have raised
the claim on appeal. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(g); see also Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(l)(c).
The respondent asserted that because the petitioner's appellate counsel was not the same as his
trial counsel and because the trial record was adequate to determine whether his trial counsel was
ineffective, the petitioner could have raised the issue of the "extreme emotional distress"
affirmative defense on direct appeal. Further, the respondent argued that the petitioner's claim
for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel must also fail, as the trial record clearly shows that
the petitioner's trial counsel's decision not to raise the affirmative defense was strategic and
specifically agreed to by the petitioner. Accordingly, the respondent requested the Court dismiss
the petitioner's surviving claims.
On July 28, 2009, the petitioner filed a memorandum in opposition to the respondent's
motion for summary judgment. In his opposition, the petitioner asserted that he was never
informed of the affirmative defense within Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(4), and was told that his
mental evaluations would not support the same. Despite the inconsistency of these assertions, the
petitioner argued that review of his mental evaluations is necessary to determine whether his trial
counsel was ineffective. The petitioner next reasserted the argument that his appellate counsel

3

See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-109; see also State v. Ford, 199 P.3d 892, 896 (Utah 2008) ("The Act indicates such
appointment should occur at the request of the petitioner, and where an evidentiary hearing would be required or the
petition involves complicated issues of law or fact that require the assistance of counsel for proper adjudication."J
(Emphasis added) (Internal quotations omitted).
4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Page
Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

uuo

was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of his trial counsel's ineffectiveness regarding the
affirmative defense. Further, the petitioner averred that the respondent's reliance on the trial
record regarding his counsel's strategic decision to not raise the affirmative defense is misplaced.
The petitioner asserted that the "extreme emotional distress" affirmative defense discussed by his
trial counsel on the record is not the same as that contained in the 2009 version of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-202(4), which he argued is relevant to the surviving claims within his petition.4
Accordingly, the petitioner argued that the respondent's motion is unresponsive.
Also on July 28, 2009, the petitioner filed a motion for default regarding the timeliness of
the respondent's motion for summary judgment. In his motion, the petitioner argued that the
respondent had untimely submitted its motion. The petitioner asserted that the Court's extension
of time for the respondent to submit its response to the petitioner's surviving claims ended July
12, 2009. Accordingly, the petitioner averred that because the respondent's motion for summary
judgment was not served until July 13, 2009, the respondent's pleading was untimely and must
be disregarded.
On August 4, 2009, the respondent filed a memorandum in opposition to the petitioner's
motion for default. In its opposition, the respondent argued that the Utah Post-Conviction
Remedies Act does not permit judgments by default against the State of Utah, but rather requires
4

The Court notes that the petitioner's opposing memorandum attempts to confuse the substance of his surviving
claims. The petition for post-conviction relief and its supporting memorandum both asserted claims for ineffective
assistance of counsel for failing to raise the affirmative defense of "extreme emotional distress". See Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief of an Illegal Conviction, pg.4, \ C; see also Memorandum in Support of 65C Petition, pgs.
12, 16-17, 42-43, 49-50. The petitioner's claims for ineffective assistance of counsel regarding this defense are the
claims for which the Court required the respondent's pleading, not the alternative manslaughter affirmative defense
that the petitioner incorrectly references in his opposing memorandum. See Order of Partial Dismissal and Requiring
Respondent's Pleading. The Court notes that a petitioner's attempt to reconfigure his claims in an opposing
memorandum is generally an impermissible tactic, unless good cause is shown. See State v. Lafferty, 175 P.3d 530,
541 (Utah 2007); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(c). Here, the Court finds that the petitioner has not demonstrated
good cause to reconfigure his petition's surviving claims to pertain to the alternative manslaughter affirmative
defense. Indeed, both the trial and appellate court records and the materials submitted by the parties clearly do not
support a defense based upon "a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal justification or excuse for
the conduct although the conduct was not legally justifiable or excusable under the circumstances." Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-202(4) (2009).
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a petitioner to establish a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome in light of the facts
proved in the post-conviction proceeding. Regardless, however, the respondent asserted that July
12, 2009, was a Sunday and that service of its motion for summary judgment on the following
Monday, July 13, 2009, constitutes a timely submission under Rule 6(a) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the respondent requested the Court deny the petitioner's motion
for default.
On August 13, 2009. the respondent filed a request to submit for decision regarding its
motion for summary judgment.
ANALYSIS
As a preliminary matter, the Court shall address the merits of the petitioner's motion for
default regarding the timeliness of the respondent's motion for summary judgment.
Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part:
"Within 30 days (plus time allowed under these rules for service by mail)
after service of a copy of the petition upon the respondent, or within such
other period of time as the court may allow, the respondent shall answer or
otherwise respond to the portions of the petition that have not been
dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response upon the petitioner
in accordance with Rule 5(b)."
Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(i) (Emphasis added). Further, Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides in relevant part:
"When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of the
court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time,
the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion ... with or
without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor is
made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as
extended by a previous order[.]"
Id. at 6(b). Moreover, Rule 6 also provides that:
"The last day of the period so computed shall be included, unless it is a
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event the period runs
6
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until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal
holiday."
Id. at 6(a) (Emphasis added).
Here, the Court issued its order requiring the respondent's pleading on April 9, 2009.
This order directed the respondent to file its response within thirty (30) days of its issuance.
Subsequently, on May 15, 2009, the respondent filed a motion for enlargement of time regarding
its response based upon a delay in its receipt of the record and transcripts from the petitioner's
trial. The Court found good cause in the respondent's motion and granted the same by order
dated May 18, 2009. This order extended the time for the respondent's pleading to thirty (30)
days after the respondent's receipt of the trial record and transcripts. The respondent received the
trial record and transcripts on May 28, 2009. Subsequently, on July 6, 2009, the respondent filed
a second motion for enlargement of time regarding its responsive pleading based upon caseload
issues. On July 7, 2009, the Court issued an order granting the respondent's second motion for
enlargement of time, finding that good cause existed for the same and permitted the respondent
until July 12, 2009, to submit its responsive pleadings. Thereafter, the respondent served its
motion for summary judgment on Monday, July 13, 2009.
Based on the foregoing timeline, considered in the context of the language of Rules 6 and
65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court finds that the respondent's service of its
motion for summary judgment on Monday, July 13, 2009, was a timely response to the surviving
claims within the petition for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the
petitioner's motion for default.
Having now determined that the respondent's motion for summary judgment was timely
submitted, the Court shall address the merits of such motion.

Page 7
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Summary judgment is appropriate only, "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). As discussed herein above, the petitioner has raised two
(2) claims that survived dismissal for frivolity and the respondent has moved for summary
judgment on each of these claims. The Court shall address each of the petitioner's surviving
ineffective assistance of counsel claims in turn:
1.

The petitioner has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact to preclude
summary judgment on his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise
the "extreme emotional distress" affirmative defense to aggravated murder set forth
in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(4).
The Utah Post-Conviction Remedies Act provides that any claims that a petitioner raised

or could have raised on direct appeal are procedurally barred. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9106(1). "Indeed, 'a petition for post-conviction relief is a collateral attack of a conviction and/or
sentence and is not a substitute for direct appellate review/" Loose v. State, 135 P.3d 886, 889
(Utah Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Myers v. State, 94 P.3d 211,214 (Utah 2004)).
Here, the petitioner has argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the
affirmative defense to aggravated murder set forth at Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(4) regarding
"extreme emotional distress". "[Ineffective assistance of [trial] counsel should be raised on
[direct] appeal if [1] the trial record is adequate to permit decision of the issue and [2] defendant
is represented by counsel other than trial counsel." State v. Litherland, 12 P.3d 92, 96 (Utah
2000^ (Internal Quotations omitted).
In the instant matter, it is undisputed that the petitioner was represented on his direct
appeal by counsel other than his trial counsel. Thus, the Court finds that the second factor for
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determining whether a claim could have been raised on direct appeal is clearly met with regard to
the petitioner's first claim.
Moreover, with regard to the first factor, "[a] party to an appeal in a criminal case may
move the court to remand the case to the trial court for entry of findings of fact, necessary for the
appellate court's determination of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel" Utah R. App. P.
23B(a). The existence of Rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure ensures that the
petitioner's appellate court would have had a sufficient record to adjudicate any viable claim of
ineffective assistance of the petitioner's trial counsel. See Litherland, 12 P.3d at 98-99 ("[Where,
on direct appeal, defendant raises a claim that trial counsel was ineffective .... defendant bears
the burden of assuring the record is adequate. This holding merely clarifies the effect of rule
23B. ... Where the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies
resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed
effectively.") (Emphasis in original). Indeed, in this matter the petitioner raised claims of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel on his direct appeal. See Ross, 174 P.3d at 638-640. Thus,
the Court finds that the first requirement for determining whether a claim could have been raised
on direct appeal is also clearly met with regard to the petitioner's first claim.
The Court, therefore, finds that the petitioner could have brought his claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel regarding his counsel's failure to raise the affirmative defense of
"extreme emotional distress" on direct appeal. Accordingly, the Court must GRANT the
respondent's motion for summary judgment on the petitioner's first claim, as such claim is
procedurally barred as a matter of law by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(l)(c) and Rule 65C(g)(l)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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However, the Utah Post-Conviction Remedies Act provides that an individual may seek
relief on the basis that a claim could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal "if the
failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel." Utah Code Ami. § 78B9-106(3). Accordingly, for this exception to the procedural bar to apply, the petitioner must
demonstrate that the failure to raise a claim on direct appeal was due to the ineffective assistance
of appellate counsel. See Lafferty, 175 P.3d at 540-42. This leads the Court to consider the
petitioner's second claim, which relates to an alleged ineffective assistance of the petitioner's
appellate counsel for failing to raise issue with regard to the effectiveness of the petitioner's trial
counsel for not presenting the "extreme emotional distress" affirmative defense.
2.

The petitioner has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact to preclude
summary judgment on his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise issue with the effectiveness of trial counsel with regard to the "extreme
emotional distress" affirmative defense to aggravated murder set forth in Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-202(4).
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a petitioner must establish: (1)

his attorneys' performance was deficient and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced his case.
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Given these requirements, the Utah Supreme
Court has indicated that, "[a] post-conviction petitioner can show that his appellate counsel was
ineffective by showing that appellate counsel prejudiced his case by omitting a claim that is a
dead-bang-winner." Taylor v. State, 156 P.3d 739, 746 (Utah 2007) (Internal quotations omitted).
"This requires the petitioner to show that appellate counsel [1] omitted an issue which is obvious
from the trial record and [2] one which probably would have resulted in reversal on appeal" Id.
(Internal quotations omitted) (Emphasis added).
Here, the petitioner has argued that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise issue with his trial counsel's effectiveness regarding the "extreme emotional distress"
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affirmative defense. While the petitioner has correctly framed his argument as a claim of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, thus avoiding the procedural bar of the PostConviction Remedies Act, his argument ignores controlling case law regarding ineffective
assistance of counsel and the clear trial record in this matter.
First, under the standard set for by the Utah Supreme Court in Taylor, any claim that the
petitioner's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the "extreme emotional distress"
affirmative defense, must be obvious from the trial record. See 156 P.3d at 746; see also Lafferty,
175 P.3d at 539. In this regard, it is noteworthy that, "[a] fair assessment of attorney performance
requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight... and to
evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. A
petitioner must "rebut the strong presumption that under the circumstances, the challenged action
might be considered sound trial strategy." Litherland, 12 P.3d at 99 (Internal quotations omitted).
"Court[s] will not second-guess trial counsel's legitimate strategic choices, however flawed those
choices might appear in retrospect." State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah Ct App 1993).
Here, the trial record conclusively demonstrates that the petitioner's trial counsel's
decision not to raise the "extreme emotional distress" affirmative defense was not only strategic,
but was specifically agreed to by the petitioner. On November 8, 2004, after closing arguments
in the petitioner's trial, and with the jury in deliberation, the Court held a conference in chambers
with counsel and the petitioner present. See Reporter's Transcript, Proceedings (In Chambers),
Trial Volume 5 of 6 (Nov. 8, 2004). During this conference, the petitioner's counsel explained
that he did not present the "extreme emotional distress" affirmative defense as part of his trial
strategy due to evidentiary problems known to himself and the petitioner. Id. at pg. 20, In. 6-25;
pg. 21, In. 1-23. Specifically, the petitioner's trial counsel stated:
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"There is, your honor, and - and it's a matter I think should be put on the
record.
Mr. Ross and I have talked about this, but as to the matter of strategy
that was in this case -- and I think it's important maybe for later on down
the road.
Basically, Mr. -- Mr. — when I represented — started representing Mr.
Ross we spoke ~ / spoke with the county attorney and there was an offer
made. If Mr. Ross would plead guilty, he would receive life without parole.
Mr. Ross and I discussed that. It was his decision that he did not want life
without parole, that — that he, in fact, desired the death penalty.
And I instructed him at that point that even if he pled guilty -- and there
was a question of whether or not there could be an admission — evidence
problems in taking that guilty pica of Mr. Ross - giving that guilty plea.
But in the event the guilty plea was accepted, I explained to him that
there would still be the necessity of a hearing, a sentencing hearing, that
the judge can not impose the death penalty without that hearing.
And I advised him, Mr. Ross, that if that was his position then it was to
his benefit to have a trial because, basically, the same evidence would be
introduced at the sentencing hearing as a trial. And if he had the trial, that
would keep his options open, not only for possible appeal down the road,
but also for his testimony at the penalty phase of the hearing.
I think the court can question Mr. Ross, but Mr. Ross was in agreement
with that strategy. I think we followed through with that strategy. There
was no manslaughter defense raised based on any extreme emotional
disturbance because of- because of evidentiary? problems as are known to
Mr. Ross and myself
But anyway, that strategy has been followed and I think if there is a
penalty phase, Mr. Ross will testify: And I think once that happens, what
he testifies to is revealed, I think well -- we'll show the — the
reasonableness of that strategy. And so I just wanted to put that on the
record in case down the road, who knows what will happen.
But anyway, that's the reason I've done what I've done. 1 think Mr. Ross
~ he and I have talked about this a lot, on numerous occasions, and I
think he agrees with that strategy. So I'd like to put that on the record."
Id. (Emphasis added). Following these statements, the Court inquired with the petitioner as to
whether the referenced conversations and trial strategy decisions were discussed and agreed to.
Id. at pg. 21, In. 24-25; pg. 22, In. 1. To this inquiry, the petitioner responded: "Yes, your honor."
Id. at pg. 22, In. 2 (Emphasis added).
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Given the statements of the petitioner's trial counsel and the petitioner within the trial
record regarding the strategic decision not to raise the "extreme emotional distress" affirmative
defense, and the strong presumption given to trial strategies, the Court finds that a claim for
ineffective assistance of trial counsel based upon the failure of counsel to raise the affirmative
defense would not have been obvious from the trial record at the petitioner's direct appeal.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the petitioner cannot satisfy the first prong of his ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel claim.
Moreover, because the petitioner's trial counsel's decision to not raise the affirmative
defense was strategic, the petitioner must set forth facts and argument to rebut the strong
presumption of effectiveness regarding this decision to satisfy the second prong of his ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel claim, i.e. that the claim probably would have resulted in reversal
on appeal. See Taylor, 156 P.3d at 746; see also Lafferty, 175 P.3d at 539. In reviewing the
pleadings and supporting materials submitted by the petitioner, the Court finds that the petitioner
has not met his burden with respect to this second prong. This is not the case of the failure to
raise a "dead-bang-winner."
Accordingly, in failing to establish his trial counsel's ineffectiveness, the petitioner has
not established such obvious error, as is required under Taylor and Lafferty to render his
appellate counsel's failure to raise such issue on appeal constitutionally ineffective. See 156 P.3d
at 746; see also 175 P.3d at 539 "Proof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a
speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality." State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1162
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citing Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993)). Therefore,
because the petitioner has not met his burden of establishing his ineffective assistance of
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appellate counsel claim, the Court must GRANT the respondent's motion for summary judgment
on the petitioner's second claim.
CONCLUSION
Based upon a careful consideration of all the pleadings in this case, and the materials
submitted in support thereof, the Court finds that the petitioner has failed to "set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial" with respect to each of the claims he raises.
See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). Accordingly, the Court finds that the respondent is entitled to
summary judgment on each of the petitioner's claims as a matter of law. The Court, therefore,
GRANTS the respondent's motion for summary judgment and shall dismiss the petitioner's
petition for post-conviction relief. Further, and as discussed herein above, the Court DENIES the
petitioner's motion for default.
Pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court directs the
respondent to prepare an appropriate order that is consistent with and reflects this Ruling.
Date signed: Dr^
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FILED

Ruling on Petitioner's Motion to Appoint Counsel

APR 2 4 2009
VD28647833

SECOND
DISTRICT COURT

paqes: 4

080700641 STATE OF UTAH

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TROVON DONTA ROSS,
Petitioner,
vs.

RULING ON PETITIONER'S MOTION
TO APPOINT COUNSEL
Case No. 080700641

STATE OF UTAH,

Judge Rodney S. Page

Respondent.

COMES NOW the Court and having reviewed the petitioner's motion to appoint counsel
and being fully advised in the premises rules as follows:
BACKGROUND
On October 24, 2004, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief and affidavit
and application for waiver of court fees. Concurrent therewith, the petitioner filed a motion for
appointment of counsel. Subsequently, on November 6, 2008, the Court reviewed the petitioner's
affidavit and application for waiver of court fees and found the petitioner indigent and provided
him with notice, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-2-306, of the initial partial filing fee
associated with the filing of his petition. Thereafter, the petitioner paid the initial partial filing
fee and submitted an amended statement of facts and memorandum in support of his petition.
On April 9, 2009, and following the Court's preliminary review of the petition and
supporting materials, pursuant to Rule 65C(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court
issues an order of partial dismissal and requiring respondent's pleading.
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On April 23, 2009, the petitioner renewed his request for appointment of counsel by
filing the instant motion to appoint counsel. The petitioner's basis for the instant motion is the
Court's order requiring the respondent's pleading.
ANALYSIS
The Utah Post-Conviction Remedies Act sets forth the rales that govern petitions for
post-conviction relief. See Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-101 et seq.;see also Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(a).
Specifically, Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-109 establishes when pro bono counsel maybe appointed
in post-conviction matters, to wit:
"If any portion of the petition is not summarily dismissed, the court may,
upon the request of an indigent petitioner, appoint counsel on a pro bono
basis to represent the petitioner in the post-conviction court or on postconviction appeal."
Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-109(l) (Emphasis added); see also State v. Ford, 199 P.3d 892, 896
(Utah 2008). "The Act indicates such appointment should occur at the request of the petitioner,
and where an evidentiaiy hearing would be required or the petition involves complicated issues
of law or fact that require the assistance of counsel for proper adjudication" Ford, 199 P.3d at
896 (Emphasis added) (Internal quotations omitted); see also Utah Code Ann. §786-9-109(2).
In the instant matter, as the respondent has not yet submitted a responsive pleading that
addresses the petitioner's surviving claims, the Court has not determined whether an evidentiary
hearing is necessary. Further, the Court summarily dismissed the majority of the petitioner's
claims without reviewing the merits of the petitioner's surviving claims; thus, the complexity of
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the petitioner's remaining claims and the need for the appointment of counsel for the proper
adjudication of such claims is uncertain at this time.
Accordingly, at this point in the proceedings, the Court finds the petitioner's motion to
appoint counsel premature.1 The Court therefore DENIES the petitioner's motion to appoint
counsel.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, the Court DENIES the petitioner's motion to appoint
counsel. However, the Court grants the petitioner leave to renew his motion to appoint counsel at
the proper time in the proceedings. This ruling shall also constitute the Court's order in this
matter; no separate order is required.
Date signed: ( f y u J l ^ M j £001
UyrxQouuL^
•AJUA

J>6 .

r*}

DISTRICT"C0URT JUDGE
^^irSSoiSi^.
RODNEY S. PAGE

£ SfcCOAfcfV

^^m^^^

1

This is not to say that at some later point in the proceedings the Court would be unwilling to order the appointment
of pro bono counsel. The petitioner may certainly renew his motion to appoint counsel at a more appropriate time,
such as, if and when the Court determines that an evidentiary hearing on his petition for post-conviction relief is
necessary following the submission of the respondent's pleading.
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